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Abstract
This dissertation examines the factors associated with the diffusion of state
constitutional victims’ rights amendments across the United States in the twenty-year
period of 1982 to 2001 to understand the impact of the federal government on state
constitutional change. Because each branch of the federal government took prominent
actions in the area of victims’ rights on the national policy stage during this era, it is
important to know whether these actions influenced policy change at the state level. This
dissertation examines whether one form of prominent federal action, the president’s use
of rhetoric to acknowledge support for victims’ rights, influenced the adoption of state
constitutional victims’ rights amendments. Using the theory of diffusion to suggest the
transfer of policy ideas, from the president to the states, the study constructs a variable to
represent the influence of presidential rhetoric in the states by indexing values derived
from a content analysis of presidential documents with presidential election results by
state. Utilizing this variable among other potential factors including policy innovation,
crime rate, ideology, interest groups, and legislative structure, the study then conducts an
event history analysis using the semi-parametric model Cox Regression. Results of this
study enrich an understanding of presidential power, federalism, and state government by
revealing the limitations of the president’s influence and supporting the influence of
factors such as innovation, crime rate, and legislative structure.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
I. State Constitutions and Change
State constitutional history has had a long and important, yet often overlooked,
career in America. Part of its historical significance lies in the salience of
constitutionalism among the colonists. The new state constitutions represented a
continuation of the colonists’ heritage of constitutions that extended back into the history
of British government (Kotkin and Kramer 2004, 40). In nascent America, jurisdictions
looked to the adoption of constitutions in the movement toward independence from
England. Three colonies adopted provisional constitutions in 1776, prior to the
Declaration of Independence, which were intended to remain in effect until a resolution
had been reached in the conflict with England.1 Within this same period, the Colony of
Virginia was the first to adopt a Declaration of Rights that was distinguished from the
body of the constitution (Adams 2001). Following the adoption of the Declaration of
Independence in 1776, six states adopted constitutions (Adams 2001, 3-4). These
constitutions sought to provide the necessary governing structures that were eliminated
with declaring independence from the Crown (Kotkin and Kramer 2004, 39). Two states,
Rhode Island and Connecticut, did not adopt a new constitution for several decades to
come because their charters were amenable to removing the remnants of monarchy
without having to undergo full revision. That is, their charters already allowed state
officers to be elected popularly (Kotkin and Kramer 2004, 40).
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New Hampshire on January 6, 1776; South Carolina on March 26, 1776; and New Jersey on July 2, 1776.
(Adams 2001, 3)
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Although most of these constitutions have undergone significant revision since
their adoption, the legacy of the state constitutions is clear. In addition to providing the
structure of the early state governments, these constitutions also served as models for the
federal constitution adopted in Philadelphia in 1787, rather than being modeled after the
British constitution (Adams 2001). Adams describes that the brief term of the executive
and the role of the senator was more closely related to state governors and senators rather
than the British monarch and lords (2001, 2). Furthermore, Adams specifies that the
tripartite separated powers in the U.S. Constitution did not resemble the British structure
(2001, 2).
Despite the historical influence of state constitutions in the Founding era,
scholarly attention on state constitutions has since been limited in comparison to that of
their federal counterpart for several reasons (Tarr 1998). Critiques of state constitutions
vis-à-vis their federal counterpart have focused on concerns including state constitutions’
frequency of change and the nature of their content (Tarr 1998).
Tarr highlights the concern over this relatively frequent change, arguing that the
comparatively frequent amendment process of state constitutions does little to promote
the sense of “reverence” that is present in the relatively unchanged federal Constitution
(1998, 3). His study of state constitutions further examines a number of explanations put
forth to account for states’ frequency to enact constitutional change; these include
responsiveness to public opinion, ease of the process, and the inability to resolve political
problems within the state (Tarr 1998, 29).
While state constitutional debates reveal that states also considered fundamental
issues, like those which faced the Framers in the federal constitutions (Dinan 2009), the
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comparatively commonplace issues addressed in state constitutions have resulted in less
research focused on their study (Tarr 1998, 2). Tarr explains, “State constitutions
juxtapose broad statements of principle with provisions on subjects as mundane as ski
trails and highway routes, public holidays and motor vehicle revenues” (1998, 2).
Clearly, however, there are important differences in the state and federal
constitutions. They differ in their consideration of the mechanisms of direct democracy,
veto power of the executive and the judiciary, consideration of the system of
bicameralism, and the concept of liberty as embodied by positive rights in addition to
negative rights (Dinan 2009, 3). Positive rights are those that oblige another to provide
the holder with a right, such as requiring a state to allow individuals to vote. These
contrast with the concept of a negative right which restricts another from preventing a
holder from an action, such as restricting the ability of Congress to make a law which
abridges one’s right to exercise their religion. Dinan’s discussion of positive rights
acknowledges efforts made at the federal level to secure positive rights were largely
unsuccessful. These included workers’ rights during the Progressive Era, the most
successful of which was the child-labor amendment which survived Congress but was not
subsequently ratified by the state legislatures (Dinan 2009, 184). Dinan describes that
legal thought in the 1960s argued that the U.S. Constitution could be regarded as
protecting both economic and social rights (2009, 185), however, subsequent Supreme
Court cases explicitly circumscribed the concept of positive rights in the Constitution.2

2

According to Dinan, despite earlier opinions in Shapiro v. Thompson (1969) and Goldberg v. Kelly (1970)
which acknowledged the public assistance as promoting the “general Welfare,” the Supreme Court declared
in Dandridge v. Williams (1970) that allocation of welfare funds was outside of its power. In DeShaney v.
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Efforts to secure positive rights regarding a clean environment enjoyed activity in the late
1960s to early 1970s but did not receive very much support; more recent attempts at
environmental amendments have also been unsuccessful (Dinan 2009, 185).
Compared to federal efforts, there has been much more success in securing
positive rights in state constitutions. States have considered and adopted positive rights in
the environment, economic, and social policy areas (Dinan 2009, 187). Positive rights
secured in areas such as work hours, work conditions, minimum wage and injury
compensation were successful in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
whereas the latter twentieth century saw success in positive rights toward union
organization, economic and social security, and the environment (Dinan 2009, 187).
Despite the lack of scholarly attention on state constitutions compared to the
federal constitution, their study remains important for many reasons. State constitutions
are indispensable to understanding state governments and their politics. Tarr outlines the
important purposes they serve, including creating their individual governments,
structuring their political conflict and the mechanism for their resolution, and
representing the goals of its citizenry (1998, 3). In addition, state constitutions are
important to an understanding of constitutionalism in America (Tarr 1998, 4), an
assertion further underscored by Dinan’s study of convention debates (2009). As such, a
study of constitutional change over time is important to understand how changes have
occurred in society and politics within a state (Tarr 1998, 4) as well as across the states.

Winnebago (1989) the Court denied the idea that the Due Process Clause provided positive rights to
citizens (Dinan 185-186).
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Furthermore, the study of state constitutional change is important to an understanding of
the conditions associated with enshrining positive constitutional rights.
To this end, this dissertation examines whether the federal government, through
the influence of presidential rhetoric, has the ability to shape constitutional change in the
states. Previous literature suggests the federal government has been influential in the
adoption of state policies; however, it is unknown how, or to what extent, the federal
government’s influence extends to the alteration of state constitutions and whether this
influence includes presidential rhetoric. This is a significant area of concern for several
reasons. First, the adoption of amendments in state constitutions is commonly conceived
of as a higher hurdle than enacting statutory legislation. For example, Lupia et al.
highlights that constitutional amendments may be preferable policy choices because their
legal status is more intractable than that of statutory legislation (2010, 1222). As such,
factors associated with adoption of constitutional amendments may reflect a greater
degree of influence. Furthermore, because state constitutions structure the government of
the states, factors which affect state constitutional change may possess a substantively
different form of influence. Hume calls attention to the notion that constitutional
amendments carry not only “policy consequences” but they also carry “institutional
consequences” as they restrict the actions of state political institutions (2011, 1098). As
such, the extent to which the federal government or other factors enjoy such influence
over state policies as well as state institutions, may be critical to our understanding of the
autonomy of the states and/or the relationship between the federal and state governments
in the U.S. system of federalism.
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Furthermore, it is important to an understanding of American political institutions
to recognize how, or to what extent, the federal government may seek influence in the
states because of the relatively greater constraints it faces in enacting change in the
federal Constitution. The ease in which constitutional change may occur in the states and
its greater propensity to adopt positive rights may reflect the comparatively receptive
environment of state constitutions for current passions whereas the more steadfastly
unchanged negative rights of the federal Constitution create relatively infertile ground for
these efforts. Therefore, rather than a distinct political jurisdiction, these state
constitutions may function as another policy venue for interests and actors.
To examine the influence of the federal government in state constitutional change,
this study will utilize the adoption of victims’ rights in the United States which occurred
in the late twentieth century. Victims’ rights provide an effective case study for the
consideration of federal influence in state constitutional change because, as this study
will detail in the following chapter, the victims’ rights era of the late twentieth century
was marked by notable, and oftentimes high-profile, federal policy activity advancing
victims’ rights. Furthermore, this policy activity occurred in each branch of the tripartite
government.
The study focuses on the actions of the president during this period because of the
notable efforts of presidents to support, and even champion, victims’ rights policies.
Because the president is the most visible political actor in the United States, he or she
possesses the potential to increase the salience of an issue and place it on the policy
agenda. Furthermore, as media technology advances and ostensibly expands the
president’s ability to reach individuals throughout the U.S., presidents may extend their
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influence into state policy domains. Thus, it is increasingly important to understand how
this influence may manifest and whether it extends to state constitutional change.
Despite prominent presidential pronouncements and the high-profile federal
activity in this area, only two-thirds of the states adopted a victims’ rights amendment in
the late twentieth century era associated with the victims’ rights movement. Research is
needed to understand how presidential rhetoric influenced adoption in these states. Thus,
the main research question of this study is the extent to which presidential rhetoric
influences the adoption of state constitutional victims’ rights.

II. Study Preview
Chapter Two will review the academic literature known as “diffusion of
innovations.” The theory of policy diffusion is used to analyze the influence of
presidential rhetoric on the state policy adoption. Because policy diffusion examines the
transfer of an innovation between governments, it is useful to a study of the transfer of
policy ideas between the federal government and the states. The discussion will highlight
the myriad foci of diffusion studies, including the targets of study, the factors that have
been investigated, and the methods that have been employed. Attention will be focused
on “vertical diffusion,” which examines policy transfer from a “top-down” or “bottomup” dimension which is especially relevant to the relationship of the federal government
to the states. It will also include diffusion studies in criminal justice as well as the
adoption of constitutional amendments. Finally, literature regarding the influence of
presidential rhetoric will be reviewed.
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Chapter Three describes relevant historical events, political actors, and policy
activity to explain the context for victims’ rights policies and constitutional amendment
adoption. This discussion includes the social and political background of victims’ rights
that hallmarked the late twentieth century as the era of the “victims’ right movement.” It
further details the efforts toward the development of policies championed at both the state
and federal levels during this period. Consideration of the content of victims’ rights
constitutional amendments highlights the nature of their provisions as well as their
variation.
Chapter Four details the development of a variable to be included in the study’s
diffusion analysis (see Chapter Five) to represent federal influence through presidential
rhetoric. The variable is a measure of federal action constructed from a content analysis
of thousands of documents of presidential rhetoric and indexed with presidential election
results by state to represent state receptivity to presidential influence. Methods and results
are discussed.
Chapter Five outlines the event history analysis used in assessing the influence of
presidential rhetoric in the states. Presidential rhetoric and other covariates are analyzed
in non-parametric and semi-parametric models. Methods and results of the statistical
analyses are presented and discussed.
Chapter Six provides a concluding analysis of the present study, including
limitations of the study. An examination of contextual factors in a case study highlights
the evolution of factors that may be associated with the adoption of a victims’ rights
constitutional amendment. Finally, potential future directions of state constitutional
change via policy diffusion and presidential rhetoric studies are considered.
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Chapter 2: Review of Literature
I. Introduction
An examination of the factors associated with state constitutional change involves
a broad range of academic inquiry. A primary method in which scholars have attempted
to account for policy change has been the theory of policy diffusion, which suggests that
governments influence other governments in the adoption of innovations. This approach
is especially useful in an examination of federal influence of state policy adoption. The
literature reviewed will include the theories underlying the mechanisms of influence,
horizontal-vertical dimensions of diffusion, and external and internal factors associated
with diffusion. It will then narrow its focus to discuss studies more specifically related to
the diffusion of criminal justice policies and the diffusion of constitutional rights.
Although policy diffusion and state constitutional rights have been investigated, the
presently limited diffusion studies regarding constitutional amendments suggest the
importance of public opinion and institutions. What is missing from constitutional
amendment studies is the examination of the role of federal government actions in
influencing the adoption of such policies. Diffusion literature suggests the federal
government is influential in the increase in policy salience as well as in creating a
financial context which makes policy adoption more-or-less likely; this research
complements previous studies by asking whether federal government influence extends to
a state’s constitution. Furthermore, as the present study operationalizes presidential
rhetoric as a representation of federal influence, the body of presidential rhetoric studies
is also discussed. Numerous research studies have asked how, when, and why statements
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made by the president affect other aspects of the political system. Missing from this
literature is an investigation into the role of presidential influence in state constitutional
change. The consequences of federal influence, through presidential rhetoric, in state
constitutional change is critical to an understanding of federalism in the United States.

II. Diffusion of Innovations
Diffusion of innovations represents a considerable line of scholarly research that
attempts to explain how innovations occur across jurisdictions. As in the present study,
diffusion research has commonly examined how policies have been adopted across
jurisdictions. Its application in policy innovation inquiries has been vast and diverse
along myriad domains, including, for example, health care, such as the diffusion of
smoke free laws in Canada (Nykiforuk, Eyles and Campbell 2008); economic, such as
regulatory reforms in Latin American countries (Meseguer 2005), and environmental,
such as state hazardous waste policies (Daley and Garand 2005). Diffusion studies have
also extended beyond an understanding of policy innovation to include, for example, the
diffusion of types of government as well as institutions (Graham, Shipan and Volden
2013, 675; Kopstein and Reilly 2001; Dongwook 2013).
Although the dependent variable in diffusion studies has commonly involved the
adoption of policies, some research has taken a more nuanced approach by defining the
dependent variable through specific attributes of influence. For example, some studies
have found support for influence in the early phases of legislation which were later
mitigated in subsequent phases (Karch and Rosenthal 2016) or differentiated from
subsequent changes in the law (Karch and Cravens 2014, 482). Of particular interest to
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the present study are those literatures which investigate the mechanism of influence, the
horizontal or vertical direction of influence, external or internal factors associated with
the adoption of policies, and diffusion studies which have examined constitutional
amendments and criminal justice policies.

Mechanism of Influence
The idea that one jurisdiction is influenced by another jurisdiction assumes a
causal mechanism, and this mechanism is often explicitly identified within diffusion
studies. Diffusion scholars identify these causal mechanisms as including competition,
coercion, learning and socialization. Their application and efficacies are discussed in the
following sections.
Competition. Competition is thought to encourage diffusion by incentivizing
action in one jurisdiction to capitalize on a competing action in another, often nearby,
jurisdiction. Competition is described as entailing strategic behavior on the part of
governments toward competing for revenues from tourism or tax bases but may also
result in trade wars or a “race to the bottom” in the provision of services (Graham, Shipan
and Volden 2013, 692). For example, Baybeck, Berry and Siegel found support for
competition among governments influencing policy adoption in the quest for lottery
dollars (2011).
Coercion. Coercion involves the imposition of policy preferences on a
government. Coercion may be achieved by creating a contingency of behavior in one
policy area on another, or by applying sanctions over weaker governments (Graham,
Shipan and Volden 2013, 692). For example, Welch and Thompson’s study illustrates
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that the speed of adoption of policies increased when federal incentives were provided
(1980).
Learning. Learning may entail not only gaining an awareness of a policy’s
effectiveness but also its political feasibility, or utility toward achieving other political
goals (Graham, Shipan and Volden 2013, 691). For example, Pacheco’s study of antismoking legislation finds support for the social contagion model where learning occurs
by voters witnessing policies in nearby states and, in turn, providing political pressure to
enact policies they support (2012). Nicholson-Crotty and Carley’s study added to the
concept of learning by finding support for the notion that a state also consider how
feasible policy implementation will be (2016). Volden’s study found that abandoning a
failed policy reflected learning between ideologically similar states and states with
professionalized legislatures (2016). Research has further differentiated learning into
types, such as Meseguer’s study of rational learning and Weyland’s application of the
concept of bounded rationality (Meseguer 2005, 74-76).
Socialization. Socialization involves altering the preferences of others through an
initiation into particular norms (Graham, Shipan and Volden 2013, 692). Some
researchers have described the mechanism of socialization with a different term, such as
emulation (Obinger, Schmitt and Starke 2013) or imitation (Shipan and Volden 2008).
Obinger, Schmitt and Starke’s 2013 study describes socialization as characterized by an
actor who seeks to conform to community norms (114). For example, Greenhill’s study
of the influence of Intergovernmental Organizations (IGO) on human rights across
countries provides support for a socializing effect (2010).
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Scholars have considered the nature of the impact of these different mechanisms
of diffusion. Graham, Shipan and Volden’s study indicated that although socialization
may take more time to achieve, it may produce more enduring effects than coercion
(2013, 693). Shipan and Volden’s 2008 study of anti-smoking policies across 675 U.S.
cities found that the impact of imitation was less persistent than the other means over
time and that these four mechanisms had different roles depending on the size of the city,
where large cities had less likelihood of engaging in imitation, being deterred due to
competition and greater likelihood to learn from others. Both small and large sized cities
shared the same level of state government coercion (Shipan and Volden 2008, 853-854).
Still other studies consider more than one causal mechanism. Boehmke and Witmer’s
2004 study of Indian gaming policies, found that states learned from each other in
adopting gaming policy, but economic competition was related to both adoption and
expansion of these policies.

Horizontal-Vertical Dimensions
In addition to considering the various mechanisms of diffusion, scholars have also
examined the directional orientation of diffusion processes. For example, diffusion may
occur between countries (Obinger, Schmitt and Starke 2013), city to city (Martin 2001),
county to county (Bouche and Volden 2011) in a horizontal orientation, and between
levels of government, such as city to state, in vertical orientation.
Horizontal Diffusion. It is diffusion across the states, however, that has perhaps
received the greatest amount of scholarly attention (Karch 2007, 54). State policy
diffusion studies have commonly considered a variety of factors as possible policy
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influences. These factors have been differentiated between those that occur outside of the
state (“external determinants”) and those that occur within (“internal determinants”). For
example, Daley and Garand’s 2005 study of state policies regarding hazardous waste,
characterized external determinants such as regional effects (which involves the influence
of geographically neighboring states) and “top-down” influence (which involves the
influence of the federal government). Their study characterized internal determinants
such as interest group pressure, severity of the problem, and socioeconomic variables
(Daley and Garand 2005).
Vertical Diffusion. While the vast research area of state-to-state policy transfer
represents horizontal diffusion, some scholarly research has also addressed the vertically
oriented diffusion of policy, such as those which may occur from a local government to a
state or from the states to the federal government (in a “bottom-up” direction) and federal
to state or state to city (in a “top-down” direction). Much of this literature has examined
the impact of the states as “laboratories of democracy;3” that is, whether the states have
influenced policy adoption in the federal government. This “bottom-up” approach
includes Ferraiolo’s 2008 study which suggested that state policies may be adopted to fill
the void of federal policies in a policy area and to influence federal policy. In addition to
filling a void, Riverstone-Newell’s 2013 study described states which adopted policy as a
challenge to federal policy. Specifically, Riverstone-Newell’s research examined factors
related to state adoption of resolutions opposing the PATRIOT Act (2013). Considering
“bottom-up” vertical diffusion from a local to state government, Shipan and Volden

This metaphor is derived from Justice Brandeis’ dissent in the 1932 case, New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann
(285 U.S. 262).
3
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(2006) found support for the theory that local anti-smoking policies can influence state
policy.
Many studies, however, such as Weissert and Scheller’s study of national health
policy, found little support for the idea that the federal government learns from the
experience of the states (2008). Similarly, Baumgartner, Gray and Lowery’s study found
little support for the idea that state activities in a policy area are positively related with
that policy making it onto the federal agenda (2011). However, Karch and Rosenthal’s
2016 study found evidence for a more nuanced influence. Karch and Rosenthal tested
learning through “bottom-up” diffusion by examining state efforts to compel
Congressional action in sales taxation in electronic commerce (2016). The study findings
suggested influence in the early phases of legislation; however, this effect was mitigated
in subsequent phases (Karch and Rosenthal 2016).
Such “bottom-up” approaches to influencing government have been
complemented by research that analyzes “top-down” influences on policy. Literature
suggests that the federal government can be vertically influential in state policy adoption
because it can influence the financial feasibility of policies (Karch 2006; Allen, Pettus
and Haider-Markel 2004; Brown 2013). National intervention affects diffusion by
altering the strength of the obstacles that prevent innovation or by providing resources to
help overcome these obstacles (Karch 2006). For example, Brown’s 2013 study
examined the effect of federal stimulus money in 2009 on state policy adoption regarding
alternatives to incarceration and found that states with lower percentages of support were
more likely to adopt policy alternatives to incarceration. Welch and Thompson’s study
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examined 57 state policies and found that policies diffused at a faster rate when federal
incentives were provided (1980).
Other national level actions appear to exert influence on direct legislation at the
state level, according to Roh and Haider-Markel (2003). Roh and Haider-Markel’s study
found that pro-choice voting seemed to be motivated by abortion decisions at the
Supreme Court level as well as higher national public opinion supporting the pro-choice
position but that it was negatively associated with presidential elections and when
spending by pro-life interest groups exceeded that of pro-choice interest groups (2003,
24-26).
Karch’s 2012 study of stem-cell legislation found that presidential speeches
influence the number of bills introduced at the state level. Focused specifically on
President’s Bush’s televised address and subsequent debate over the legislation, Karch’s
event history analysis highlighted the federal government’s ability to increase the
salience of issues which influenced the introduction of state-level policies.
Clouser McCann, Shipan and Volden’s study similarly considered the influence of the
national government in stimulating policy ideas which led to policy adoption. The
authors found that states with professionalized legislatures and policy lobbyists were
more likely to follow the federal cues regarding antismoking restrictions (2015).
Allen, Pettus, and Haider-Markel examined the influence of the federal
government in sending signals to the states concerning their preferences and the potential
for future action (2004). Allen, Pettus and Haider-Markel’s study considered state
policies including truth-in-sentencing and hate crimes to find support for the notion that
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the national government exerts influence on state policy adoption when it communicates
to the states through “strong, clear signals” regarding its preferences (2004).

External-Internal Factors
Another dimension of diffusion research has examined factors regarded as both
external to a jurisdiction, such as geographic proximity, and those regarded as internal to
a jurisdiction, such as a state’s political ideology.
External Factors. The investigation into a state’s spatial relationship to other
states was an early feature of diffusion studies, and also reflected horizontally oriented
diffusion. This line of inquiry suggested that the state’s geographic proximity to another
state might influence its adoption of a policy, such as by facilitating learning (Mooney
2001) or encouraging competition (Baybeck, Berry and Siegel 2011). For example, Rom,
Peterson and Scheve found, in their study of Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) between 1976 and 1994, that when a state reduced available welfare benefits, a
contiguous state was more likely to do so as well (1998). Their study found that this
influence of geographic proximity was greater than the influence of the states’ party
ideology, per capita income, ethnic makeup of recipients, or poverty rates (Rom, Peterson
and Scheve 1998, 36).
While geographically proximate states have been considered in many diffusion
studies, this research focus has been evolving, both in terms of how proximity is
measured and in considerations of external validity. For example, regarding
measurement, although the contiguity of states has often represented the concept of
geographic proximity, some scholars have also measured proximity as the distance
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between state capitals (Desmarais, Harden and Boehmke 2015). Regarding external
validity, scholars have signaled concern with the use of the concept of proximity. Shipan
and Volden cautioned that geographic proximity may be misleading, as it may instead
reflect similar internal characteristics of proximate states, and that it is increasingly
outdated, as governments have increasing communication abilities available (Shipan and
Volden 2012, 2). While the investigation of spatial relationships has characterized many
policy diffusion studies, more recent literature has called for an expansion into factors
beyond geographic proximity.
In addition to proximity, another relational factor explored in diffusion research
involves patterns of adoption between particular states. Walker’s 1969 study identified
certain states as leaders in policy adoption. Walker identified “pioneering states” by
creating a score of state innovativeness based on an analysis of 88 programs. The states
which received the higher score had, on average, been quicker to adopt a policy (Walker
1969, 883).4 Walker also asked whether states may have “stable patterns of diffusion”
with other states (Walker 1969, 888). Similarly, the concept of leading and following
states is adapted by Hoefler to include state institutions as leaders and followers;
specifically, Hoefler identifies courts which are “trend setting” (1994, 162). Further
relational aspects which facilitate policy transfer include the research which has been
recently explored through Desmarais, Harden and Boehme’s 2015 study inferring a

4

Walker’s scale has been updated by Boehmke and Skinner (2012) to include a “dynamic” measure of
innovativeness.
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“policy diffusion network.” Such a network involves “persistent patterns” by which
policies have been adopted state-to-state (Desmarais, Harden and Boehmke 2015).
Internal Factors. Beyond the external factors, several internal characteristics of a
state have also been considered as factors by which a state may adopt a policy innovation.
The field of internal characteristics in policy diffusion research is wide-ranging and may
include aspects of the individual states or aspects of the policy under consideration. One
such inquiry involves the internal characteristic of a state’s political ideology. Such a
study may hypothesize that politically conservative or liberal states would produce
similar policies. A policy transfer between two conservative states, for example, may
relate the internal factor of ideology with the horizontal diffusion of policy between the
two states. For example, Grossback, Nicholson-Crotty, and Peterson’s study of state
lotteries, bankruptcy laws, and sentencing guidelines found support for the idea that states
learn from other states of similar ideology which have already adopted a policy (2004).
Bergin’s meta-analysis of diffusion studies in criminal justice policies found little support
for a relationship between political ideology with the adoption of criminal justice policy,
however, Bergin cautioned that the operationalization of the concept of ideology in the
studies considered may have frustrated an analysis of this variable (2011, 414).
On the other hand, Bergin’s meta-analysis suggested the influence of policy
salience, another factor which has played a role in diffusion research inquiry. Bergin
found an association between the effects of printed media attention on the diffusion of
criminal justice policies (2011, 414). Similarly, Oakley’s study of fetal homicide laws
found an increased likelihood for policy adoption with greater media attention (2009).
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Another important factor in diffusion studies has been the role of various political
actors. Mintrom’s study of school choice policy found that the presence of a “policy
entrepreneur” increased the likelihood of policy adoption (1997). A policy entrepreneur is
described as an advocate for a policy proposal or for an idea (Kingdon 1995, 122).
According to Kingdon, the defining characteristic of an entrepreneur is the motivation to
make an investment toward a particular return, which may include personal interests or
desire to shape policy (1995, 122-3). Interest group influence has also been considered in
diffusion studies. Through a discussion of four policy areas, Bouchey illustrated how this
influence is realized through organizational capacity, issue framing and venue shopping
(2010, 141).
In addition to political actors, another internal characteristic includes the influence
of institutional capacity. The concept of “professionalization” refers to the degree of
capacity within an institution. As described by Hamm and Moncrief, professionalization
refers to the legislature’s ability “to act as an effective and independent institution”
(2013, 163). Factors which have been considered indicators of professionalization have
included compensation, length of session, and resources and facilities (Squire 2012, 267)
as well as schedule and staff (Rosenthal 1996, 175). In diffusion research, Hume
considered professionalization of both state courts and state legislatures in a study
regarding same sex marriage prohibition and found support for the relationship between
policy adoption and professionalized courts (Hume 2011). Similarly, McNeal, Tolbert,
Mossberger and Dotterweich found that legislative professionalization was related to
implementation of e-government (2003). Volden’s study found that professionalization
was related to states’ learning about policy failures (2016).
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Policy diffusion researchers have recognized the importance of considering policy
attributes in an investigation of diffusion. Makse and Volden’s 2011 study examined
criminal justice policies throughout American states within the period of 1973 and 2002.
Surveying experts in the field who categorized policies, according to Roger’s typology,
on complexity, observability, relative advantage, compatibility, and trialability, they
found that three dimensions produced statistically significant results in terms of
predicting policy adoption. The two dimensions of (higher) observability and relative
advantage promoted diffusion whereas higher complexity was associated with a lower
likelihood of diffusion (Makse and Volden 2011, 117). Bouchey’s study considers policy
type in terms of the rate of policy adoption, arguing that rapid diffusion across states
characterizes both morality policy and governance policy due to their high salience, high
participation by the masses, and low complexity. Conversely, the lower salience/higher
complexity regulatory policy diffuses in a more incremental fashion (Bouchey 2010, 64).
Nicholson-Crotty’s 2009 study also underscores the relationship between a policy’s
complexity and salience with its speed of adoption. Mallinson’s 2016 work contributes to
this area of research by suggesting that clusters of policies may spread more rapidly than
a policy standing alone. Furthermore, Mallinson supplements the methodological
approach to examining the speed of policy adoption by replacing the use of dichotomous
speed categories with a continuous variable (2016). Researchers investigating the rate of
policy adoption also found that the adoption rates can be described as a growth curve
resembling an S shape. At the outset, adoption is slow as ideas are considered, then quick
as policies are adopted within a positive feedback loop, and then resuming a slow pace as
saturation is approached (Baumgardner and Jones 2009, 17). However, some policies
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exhibit variations from this behavior. For example, research in the field of environmental
regulation indicates that the relationship of policy stringency and the rate of policy
adoption resembles a U shape (Perino and Requate 2012, 456).

Diffusion of Constitutional Amendments and Criminal Justice Policies
While the literature of policy diffusion studies is vast and involves investigation
into numerous dimensions such as different mechanisms of diffusion, horizontal-vertical
orientations of diffusion, and consideration of both internal and external factors to
different governments, important gaps of knowledge still remain. A review of literature
suggests relatively little is known about the diffusion of constitutional rights, including
that of crime victims’ rights. On an international level, Goderis and Versteeg (2014)
examined the diffusion of constitutional rights between countries, finding that countries
with similar legal, religious, and colonial origins as well as aid sources exhibited
transnational diffusion of rights to constitutions. Although literature specific to the
diffusion of rights in state constitutions is rare, a few studies have found support for the
influence of such factors as institutional elements and public opinion. Hume’s study of
same sex marriage prohibitions found support for the association between court capacity
and previous rulings as well as public attitudes in favor of the adoption of such policies
(2011) while Lupia et al.’s study of same sex marriage prohibitions found that a
combination of citizen attitudes coupled with the stringency of each state’s legislative
hurdles for amendments to be enacted determined whether constitutional amendments
were passed (2010, 1223). Although Bouchey’s 2010 study included crime victims’
constitutional amendments as one of a number of “morality” policies expected to diffuse
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rapidly, the diffusion of crime victims’ constitutional rights has been relatively
unexplored.
Numerous diffusion studies have considered policies within the criminal justice
domain; however, these have generally not addressed state constitutional amendments.
For example, internationally, diffusion has been used to understand the spread of criminal
justice policies between countries such as police accountability policies between Brazil
and the United States (Reames 2007) as well as the U.S. and the U.K. in areas such as
mandatory sentencing, three strikes policies, and zero tolerance policies (Jones and
Newburn 2006). Jones and Newburn’s study highlighted that some of the policy transfer
that occurred did so through ideas, rhetoric, and symbols (2006, 147).
Within U.S. policies, Schneider analyzed incarceration policies across states in
the period of 1890 and 2008, finding a state’s historical position was a strong predictor of
its position in the future (2012, 193). Also at the state level, Tucker, Stoutenborough, and
Beverlin considered the diffusion of concealed weapons permit laws, and found support
for geographical contiguity in the adoption of “shall issue” policies (2012).
Policy diffusion research involves a vast array of inquiry, including examinations
of the mechanisms of influence, directional orientations of influence and differentiating
internal and external factors of influence. To answer the question of whether the nation’s
most powerful political actor is influential in the adoption of state constitutional change,
policy diffusion studies with a focus on vertical diffusion, constitutional amendments,
and criminal justice policy are especially relevant. Because the influence of the
president’s words is an important component of the present study, a review of the
research in the area of presidential rhetoric is also warranted.
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III. Presidential Rhetoric
The present study focuses on presidential rhetoric as an influential factor in the
state adoption of crime victims’ constitutional amendments primarily because presidents
in the victims’ rights era of the late twentieth century (the study period) made public
pronouncements acknowledging the plight of crime victims, raising the salience of the
policy issue, and highlighting its importance. As the most visible political figure in the
United States, it is reasonable to expect that the president’s pronouncements could lead
states to act in support of victims’ rights policies. While presidential rhetoric may reflect
the attitudes of the public, research suggests presidents are influential in shaping these
attitudes as well. The president’s message may reach the public directly, creating demand
for a policy response; through media accounts, which can further highlight the president’s
message to the public and lead to demand; or to policymakers in the states who may
provide a policy response. Although research to assess the influence of presidential
rhetoric has been met with mixed findings, studies, such as Karch’s 2012 analysis of
stem-cell legislation, have supported the relationship between presidential rhetoric and
policy activity in the states. It is sensible to suspect that if presidential speeches can affect
the political agenda of a state, as in the Karch study, they may also influence adoption of
policies. There remain many unanswered questions in assessing the influence of
presidential rhetoric. This study contributes to this body of literature.
Research has considered multiple dimensions of presidential rhetoric, such as
asking the questions of “why and when” presidents employ rhetoric. Eshbaugh-Soha and
Collins’ 2015 study complements a body of literature that considers questions of “why.”
This body has found support for the idea that presidential rhetoric is used to promote
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policy goals, reelection prospects, and to highlight legacies. In addressing the question of
“when” presidential rhetoric occurs, studies have considered factors associated with the
frequency of speeches made by presidents. Results of these studies have been mixed with
some suggesting a positive association between presidential addresses and approval
ratings (Brace and Hinckley 1993; Eshbaugh-Soha 2010) while others did not support a
relationship between presidential rhetoric and public opinion (Powell 1999; and Hager
and Sullivan 1994). Eshbaugh-Soha’s 2010 study found that presidential speeches also
increase during periods of legislative success and decrease during periods of economic
hardship.
Research in presidential studies have also investigated the concept of presidential
influence. Richard Neustadt’s seminal work Presidential Power (1960) argued that
presidential power lies in the ability to persuade. Neustadt argued that the president,
bound by the institutional limitations of the office, could achieve policy goals through
bargaining with other political actors. Executive influence within policy matters is also
recognized by John Kingdon’s assertion that the president and administration are
powerful agenda-setters (2003). Kingdon’s work illustrates how political actors can call
attention to issues during windows of opportunity. Samuel Kernell’s concept of “Going
Public” focuses on the president’s ability to appeal directly to voters in an effort to create
pressure on Congress to act. Zarefsky (2004) considers how presidents attempt to
influence public opinion through defining issues. For example, one case study examined
how Ronald Reagan redefined the concept of welfare through differentiating recipients
by those who were needy and those who were undeserving (Zarefsky 2004, 617).
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The efficacy of presidential rhetoric in influencing different institutions has also
been a subject of investigation. For example, studies have considered the efficacy of
presidential influence over Congress, where Rutledge and Larsen Price found empirical
evidence that the president enjoys agenda-setting influence over Congress with an
emphasis on international policy (2014), consistent with previous works which suggested
an agenda-setting influence with Congress and the media (Edwards and Wood 1999).
Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake found evidence that presidential rhetoric has a short-term
influence on the media (2004). Olds’ analysis found that the president may only be able
to indirectly influence the public by influencing economic conditions but does not have
this indirect influence on the media (2013). Karch’s 2012 study involving the influence of
presidential speechmaking in state level stem-cell legislation demonstrated that
presidential rhetoric may influence the placement of policies onto state level political
agendas. The influence of president rhetoric has been examined regarding policy
outcomes, as well. Chapekis and Moore examined the effect of presidential rhetoric on
the prosecution of “othered” individuals related to post-9/11 framing of terrorism, finding
evidence that prosecution rates for othered individuals were significantly higher than for
non-othered individuals during periods within the Bush and Obama administrations
(2019).
The question of whether presidential rhetoric influences public opinion has been
met with mixed findings. Cohen’s 1995 study examined the influence of presidential
rhetoric on the public agenda. Results of Cohen’s time-series regression analysis of State
of Union addresses indicated a positive relationship between increased presidential
attention and public concern in the policy areas of civil rights, foreign policy, and
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economic policy. Building from Cohen’s study and methods, Hill (1998) finds a
reciprocal influence between the president and the public in foreign policy and economic
matters, and a one-way influence from president to the public in the area of civil rights.
Peake and Eshbaugh-Soha (2008) found a short-term influence in presidential rhetoric on
the media limited to roughly a third of presidential addresses in four policy areas and
were conditioned by other factors. Tedin, Rottinghaus, and Rodgers similarly found
evidence of a short-term effect in their study of three speeches made by President George
W. Bush that the president’s effort at “going public” could be effective (2011).
Montgomery, Rogol and Kingsland (2019) found that presidential rhetoric is able to
influence public assessments of the Supreme Court.
Juxtaposed with studies that supported the contention that presidential rhetoric
could be influential are those that did not support a relationship. Lee’s 2014 study
considers influence between the president, the public and the news media, finding a
relationship between the president and the media as well as the public and the media, but
none between the president and the public. George C. Edwards’ 2003 work, On Deaf
Ears, asks whether presidents are successful in being able to mobilize the public.
Ultimately, Edwards argues that the president is largely unable to move the public
because the public is inattentive to presidential messages (242). Further studies found
support for presidential influence when conditioned by other factors. For example,
studies support the idea that presidential rhetoric may be influential when voters identify
with the president (Thomas and Sigelman 1984).
Studies of presidential rhetoric have also considered the effectiveness of the mode
of communication. Young and Perkins’ examination of State of the Union (SOTU)
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addresses between 1954 to 2002 found that the influence of presidential rhetoric
decreased with the increase of cable television (1995). Tedin, Rottinghaus, and Rodgers’
2011 study considered different forms of presidential rhetoric in its evaluation of
presidential influence on public opinion. The study found that presidential addresses were
most effective at influencing policy and political opinions due to its focus and concision
while the SOTU was found to be most influential in affecting the president’s image.

IV. Study Contributions
Comprehensive research efforts in policy diffusion have established an extensive
body of literature analyzing a number of dimensions to the theory, including how and
why innovations diffuse, directional orientations of diffusion, and factors associated with
diffusion. Despite the expansive nature of diffusion literature, important gaps remain,
such as the relatively limited focus on state constitutions. The study of presidential
rhetoric has examined the president’s ability to influence others but has been generally
met with mixed findings. While the primary concern of the present study is to improve
our understanding of state constitutional change, the study also contributes to the research
on policy diffusion, and the influence of presidential rhetoric. Beyond the theoretical and
scholarly value of the present study, practical value may benefit policy practitioners and
individuals affected by such policies.
The present study will improve our knowledge regarding state constitutional
change. State constitutional research is relatively limited and yet remains an important
focus of study as it may differ in important ways from the adoption of other policy.
Missing from previous academic research in both diffusion studies and presidential
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rhetoric studies is the examination of the influence of the president, as a representative of
the federal government, on the adoption of state constitutional amendments – a question
that has important implications for the nature of federalism in the United States.
In addition to contributing to the academic literature regarding state constitutional
change, the present study will benefit the study of diffusion as it contributes to an
understanding of vertical policy diffusion. Within the consideration of why policies
spread, researchers have found support for both horizontal and vertical influence through
various levels of government, but none has previously focused on the “top-down”
influence of presidential rhetoric on state constitutions. Furthermore, although myriad
policy issues and domains have been investigated through diffusion studies, significant
questions remain regarding the factors which affect the spread of particular policies. This
study will advance an understanding of influential factors associated with victims’ rights.
The present study further contributes to research assessing the influence of
presidential rhetoric. While the influence of presidential rhetoric as a tool of political
influence has been a topic of consideration in political science scholarship for quite some
time, results of empirical analyses assessing the influence have been mixed. There have
been few prominent efforts to apply an event history analysis to a study of presidential
rhetoric influence. This study contributes to the body of presidential rhetoric literature by
both assessing this influence in the realm of state constitutional change as well as through
the application of a different analytical approach.
In addition to the theoretical and scholarly contributions, the present study will
also provide insight and information to policy practitioners concerned with the passage of
victims’ rights amendments as well as individuals who experience real-world
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consequences from the adoption of victims’ rights. Those who seek to promote or prevent
the adoption of similar policies may benefit from the study’s examination of the factors
associated with state constitutional change. This research examines the adoption of
policies which may have a significant effect on many individuals as well as on systems of
justice. Although decades have passed since the concept of victims’ rights rose to
prominence as a political issue, comprehensive inquiry into victims’ rights policy has not,
to my knowledge, been conducted. Because the experience of crime victims may have an
influence on their participation in the justice system, it is critical to understand how such
participation may be attenuated or strengthened by public policy.
Ultimately, this study asks if the influence of the most powerful political actor in
the United States – the president – extends to state constitutional change. In particular,
the study is focused on whether presidential rhetoric influences the adoption of state
victims’ rights amendments.
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Chapter 3: Victims’ Rights
I. Introduction: Why Victims’ Rights?
The policy area involving victims’ rights provides a useful case study by which to
examine the theoretical contention that the federal government influences state
constitutional change because of the significant, and sometimes high-profile,
acknowledgements of crime victims and their rights by the federal government. As this
chapter demonstrates, each of the three branches of the federal government provided
policy cues that may have influenced the states to adopt a victims’ rights. Victims’ rights
also provide a valuable case study for an analysis of the influence of presidential rhetoric
on state constitutional change because state justice systems ostensibly fall outside of the
sphere of federal influence, except where constrained by Constitutional protections. Thus,
an analysis of crime victims’ rights at the state level provides the opportunity to examine
how states may be influenced by prominent actions of the federal government in a policy
area that largely resides within the sphere of state influence.
The topic of victims’ rights is also well-suited to a study because, while all states
have some form of statutory rights for victims, only some states adopted constitutional
amendments for crime victims. Such policy variation among victims’ rights constitutional
amendments warrants investigation into the degree and nature of federal government
influence as factors associated with greater federal influence into state governance
matters implicate the concept of federalism in the United States.
This chapter will begin by examining the social and political context of the
victims’ rights era and will follow with a discussion of the development of victims’ rights
policies in each of the three branches of the federal government that occurred in
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conjunction with the adoption of victims’ rights amendments in the states. The goal of
this comprehensive examination of the development of victims’ rights is to outline the
factors which have been implicated in the development of state victims’ rights
constitutional amendments. This discussion will also highlight the normative
considerations surrounding victims’ rights policies which continue to affect
contemporary political discourse.
A brief review of the variation among state constitutional victims’ rights
amendments is included to illustrate the variation among policies. Because policy
adoption and revision in the states continue as ongoing processes, the review should be
regarded as only a snapshot in time of state constitutional victims’ rights, subject to
significant alteration, and is only presented as an illustration of potential policy variation
across the states.

II. Social and Political Context of the “Victims’ Rights Era”
The social and political context of the victims’ rights era – the latter part of the
twentieth century – is a remarkable one. It is remarkable because it reflected a societal
mood of fear as well as a confluence of partisan support for “pro-victim/anti-crime”
policy. Additionally, the legacy of this era’s policies has been recognized as exacerbating
conditions in the criminal justice system, including promoting higher incarceration rates
and harsher treatment of juveniles, as well as resulting in disparate impact on minority
groups. As such, scholars have considered the development and characterization of this
era as well as normative assessment of these policies and their larger societal effects.
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The mood of fear that characterized the victims’ rights era is represented in
Gallup’s longitudinal survey of whether residents feared walking outside within a mile of
their home. According to Gallup, the percentage of respondents who replied “yes” was in
the mid to lower 30 percent in the latter half of the 1960s. This percentage rose to its
highest point of 48 percent in the early 1980s, then began to decline to 44 percent by the
early 1990s. The decline continued into the late 1990s and by the early 2000s had
dropped to the 30 percent, although the percentage has subsequently risen to 35 percent
in the most current data (Gallup).
This mood was consistent with acknowledgement of support for victims’ rights
and crime control policies by both major parties. Republican administrations governed in
the years 1980-1992 under the Reagan and Bush administrations and Democratic
president Bill Clinton governed throughout the period from 1992 to 2000; their respective
contributions to victims’ rights policies will be discussed in the following section of this
chapter; however, their support for crime control policies in this era is notable, as well.
Under the Reagan administration, the combating of street crime was a feature of
the policy agenda (Hagan 2012). The concept of a “chronic offender” characterized
contemporary scholarship within this era and provided the basis of Reagan’s approach to
crime control; chronic offender studies argued that a small number of offenders
accounted for a large number of crimes and was put forth as an indicator of a broken
criminal justice system; it furthermore gave rise to the notion of certain criminals as
“superpredators” (see Hagan 2012, 76; 77). The age of criminology that began with the
onset of the Reagan administration is regarded as a departure from earlier emphases on
rehabilitation of offenders (see Hagan 2012, 79).
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In analyzing crime policy during the Clinton administration, scholars identify the
national mood toward crime policy as “frenzied;” rather than reflecting the downward
trend of crime incidence, fear was promulgated by media attention of crime and distorted
facts about who was committing crime, how much crime was occurring, and how tough
(or lenient) the criminal justice system was in dealing with offenders (Krisberg 1994).
Platt describes a “moral panic” created by the media and politicians, likening it to the
focus on immigrants during the Progressive Era as well as other twentieth century targets
(1994). According to Platt, the need to create a moral panic was due to “weakening
political authority” that developed as a result of unemployment, decreased public
spending, lower rates of electoral participation, and a neglected division between the
races (1994). The associated emphasis on crime control was clear. Media characterization
of criminals also fostered a sense of insecurity, as Barak’s 1994 study describes the
“twentieth century version of the media criminal,”

Media criminals have become less human, less rational, and less Eurocentric; they
have become more animalistic, vengeful, and ethnic/racial. At the same time, the
crimes of these media criminals have become more violent senseless, and
sensational. Their victims have also become more random, helpless, and innocent.
The public comes to "see" or conclude that violence and predation between
strangers is a normal way of life.

The cost of this construction was significant: the “predator” criminal concept
supported status quo economic, political, and social conditions as those factors were
largely excluded from considerations of ways to address crime; promoted the idea that
“heroes” capture criminals and the criminal justice system can resolve crime (Barak
1994).
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Juxtaposed with the social construction of criminal, the social construction of
victim has also been acknowledged by scholars. An “ideal victim” has been
conceptualized as one who reflects a particular gender, race, and class image and who is
innocent from bringing the crime onto oneself (Spalek 2006, 22). Positive construction of
victim groups has included females, children, and the elderly (Elias 1990, 243-244). Sally
Engle Merry’s research regarding battered women identified a concept of a “good victim”
as one who is herself innocent, has a “malicious” attacker, does not fight back, does not
engage in her own questionable behavior, and is cooperative with the legal system (2003,
354). The upshot of this conceptualization is that constructions of predator or good
victims can serve as the “mechanism” by which tough on crime programs may be
adopted and that positive construction of victim groups can provide political reward
(Tonry 2013, 7; Spalek 2006, 27; Elias 1990, 243-244).
The policies put forth as a panacea included providing for more officers, use of
boot camps, adult penalties for juveniles, and “three-strikes” legislation, the cost of which
included a $30 billion piece of legislation passed at the federal level in addition to the
opportunity cost of programs, such as education and healthcare, that went unfunded as
resources were directed toward increased law enforcement and prison construction
(Krisberg 1994). These actions ballooned the cost of the total criminal justice system to
$74 billon (Platt 1994). Additional costs associated with such policies included the one
and a half million individuals incarcerated and nearly five million under correctional
supervision in the early 1990s, with a disparate impact on families of color (Platt 1994;
Krisberg 1994). The disparate effect of harsh drug and crime policies on black Americans
throughout the Reagan and Bush administration, and similarly embraced by the Clinton
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administration, has been argued as having more to do with politics than with crime
patterns (Tonry 1994). Racial disparities were exacerbated by legislation, such as federal
law which punishes crack cocaine offenses much more severely than powder cocaine but
were nevertheless supported by presidential administrations across the era and beyond,
from Reagan to George W. Bush (Tonry and Melewski 2008). Research recognizes that
some policies, such as Megan’s Law, rely on emotional support rather than on an
evidence-based efficacy (Tonry 2013, 9).
Underscoring analyses of the Reagan and Clinton administrations, the bipartisan
nature of support for crime control policy is further demonstrated in Platt’s comparison of
party platforms in 1992 which illustrated the extent to which crime was a salient policy
issue for both parties (1994). An analysis of the Democrat and Republican party
platforms detailing crime policy positions highlights that both platforms acknowledge
support for additional law enforcement services, harsh or harsher penalties in some form,
and the plight of victims (see Appendix A for excerpts).
Contemporary retrospective assessments can be contrasted with the general
acceptance by both parties in the victims’ rights era regarding crime control attitudes. In
Hillary Clinton’s presidential bid in 2016, Clinton had to distance herself from her
husband’s (former president Bill Clinton) previous policy support. According to the New
York Times, “the most striking part of her speech was the unsaid but implicit rebuttal of
her husband's 1994 crime bill, which flooded America's cities with more police officers,
built dozens of new prisons and created tougher penalties for drug offenders” (Chozick
2015). Joe Biden’s ultimately successful bid for the presidency in the 2020 election
included his acknowledgement of arguably problematic aspects of the crime bill
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outcomes. When pressed by ABC News Anchor George Stephanopoulus during an
October 15, 2020 televised town hall in Philadelphia about whether the crime bill, which
resulted in mass incarceration of low-level drug offenders, represented a mistake; Biden
responded, “Yes, it was.”

III. Development of Victims’ Rights
The effort to address victims’ rights issues emerged in the latter part of the
twentieth century. Researchers place the origin of the victims’ movement in the 1960s
(Mastrocinque 2010, 95). Researchers’ accounts of the factors associated with the
development of the victims’ rights movement have offered differing perspectives. Young
and Stein identify five activities, including 1) rising crime rates occurring with a lack of
satisfaction with the criminal justice system; 2) the field of victimology developing in
criminal justice; 3) victim compensation programs at the state level; 4) the women’s
movement; and 5) rising victim activism (2004). Mastrocinque describes contributing
factors such as growing crime rates, presidential initiatives in examining and addressing
crime victims, federal and state legislation, and the emergence of victim organizations
(2010). McCormack identifies growing crime rate as a cause as well, but he also points to
the results of National Crime Surveys conducted by LEAA, the feminist movement, and
provision of victim compensation by the states (1994, 209).
A commonly identified factor associated with the development of the victims’
rights movement is the impact of rising crime rates. Rates of violent crime grew from
200.2 per 100,000 in 1965 to 461.1 in 1974. By 1984, the rate had climbed even further
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to 539.9 per 100,000. The violent crime rate peaked in 1992 at 758.2 where it then
progressively fell to 463.2 in 2004 (Federal Bureau of Investigation).
In the context of rising crime rates, President Johnson formed the President’s
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice in 1965 to address the
causes and potential solutions of crime (Mastrocinque 2010, 96). The report of the
Commission indicated a discrepancy between the incidence of victimization reported in
Uniform Crime Reports and the victimization reported in a household survey conducted
by the commission; that is, many victims failed to report their victimization to police.
This lack of reporting led to the creation of the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration (Mastrocinque 2010, 96). Survey results which found that rates of
victimization were higher than law enforcement statistics had indicated resulted in
increased scholarly attention on crime victims and their lack of trust of the criminal
justice system (Young and Stein 2004).
Juxtaposed with the rise in crime rates in this era, many due process rights of
criminal defendants were recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court under Chief Justice Earl
Warren. Protections, such as involving the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence
(Mapp v. Ohio (1961)), counsel for indigent defendants (Gideon v. Wainwright (1963)),
and the right to be informed of one’s ability to remain silent and have a lawyer present
while in custody and questioned by the police (Miranda v. Arizona (1966)), underscored
the lack of protection and rights of victims in the criminal justice system (Mastrocinque
2010, 96).
In response to the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement, states also began
to adopt victim restitution and compensation programs, which were considered ways in
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which victims could be encouraged to participate in the criminal justice system (Young
and Stein 2004). California was the first U.S. state (in 1965) to implement a victim
compensation program (McCormack 1994, 212). Young and Stein describe that early
programs may be differentiated from later programs that emerged in the degree of
advocacy of the program administrators as well as the orientation toward “welfare” in the
early programs and the orientation toward “justice” in the later programs; Young and
Stein indicate later programs recognized victims as “deserving” - independent of
financial need (2004).
Also, in this era, grassroots efforts led to the emergence of victim organizations
by the 1970s (Mastrocinque 2010, 96). Scholars recognize the influence of the women’s
movement in the development of victim organizations. According to McCormack these
efforts called attention to the vulnerability of women to particular victimization (1994,
209). Leaders within the women’s movement viewed the criminal justice system’s
response to such crimes as domestic violence and sexual assault as reflecting the unequal
status between men and women (Young and Stein 2004). According to McCormack,
1972 marked the “first grassroots effort” to help sexual assault victims (1994, 212).
In the latter part of the 1970s, the competition amongst victim organizations for
funding led to “divisions,” including between grassroots programs and those that were
part of the criminal justice system (Mastrocinque 2010, 97). Young and Stein describe
the divisions, indicating, “Many felt there was an inherent conflict between the goals of a
prosecutor or law enforcement agency and the interests of crime victims. Some sought
legal changes in the system, while others felt change could take place through the
adjustment of policies and procedures” (2004).
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In the 1970s and 1980s, several victim organizations emerged through victim
activism. For example, Victim Support Services (VSS) (formerly Families and Friends of
Missing Persons) began in 1975 in Washington after the kidnapping and murder of Lola
Linstad’s daughter, while Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) was organized by
two mothers – each of which had daughters victimized by drunk drivers (VSS 2014;
MADD 2015).
By the late 1970s, a number of states had victim assistance programs (Young and
Stein 2004). The creation of the National Organization for Victim Assistance in 1975 was
to “consolidate” the victims’ movement goals through networking and training (Young
and Stein 2004). The LEAA emerged in the 1970s to help disseminate information and
promote victim assistance through state block grants but was hampered with the
defunding of LEAA by Congress at the close of the decade (Young and Stein 2004).

IV. Federal Actions Supporting Victims’ Rights
Executive and Legislative Actions
Within this era, notable support for victims’ rights were made by both the
president and the Congress. Like Johnson’s initiative to examine crime victims in 1966,
President Reagan also initiated progress toward the victims’ movement. Reagan
established National Crime Victims’ Rights Week in 1981 and commissioned the
President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime in 1982. The Task Force’s Final Report
included 68 recommendations which involved police, courts, prosecutors, hospitals,
mental health providers, and schools; It furthermore recommended an amendment to the
Sixth Amendment that victims be granted equal status as a criminal defendant in stages of
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the court proceedings (Hook and Seymour 2004). The Final Report stimulated
developments in state and federal programs (Mastrocinque 2010, 97). At the federal
level, this included the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (VOCA). The Victims of Crime
Act created the Crime Victims Fund which was funded through fines, assessments, and
forfeitures, etc., and provided grants to states for victim assistance and compensation
programs.
Victims of Crime Act. The Victims of Crime Act was signed into law in 1984. The
Act provided federal aid to state victims’ compensation and assistance programs,
assistance to federal victims, and established a Crime Victims Fund which represents
revenue collected through criminal fines, forfeited bonds, forfeitures of profits from
crimes, and fee assessments for crimes.
The legislative history of the VOCA began following the submission of President
Reagan’s Task Force on Crime Victim’s Final Report when the U.S. Congress considered
legislation to meet the needs of crime victims. Both the U.S. House of Representatives
and the Senate devised legislation to respond to the Task Force recommendations. These
efforts eventually culminated in House Joint Resolution 648-335. Within the House,
Representative Hodino (D-NJ) introduced HR 3498 on June 30, 1983, “a bill to help
innocent victims of crime” (Congressional Record 1985, 163). The legislation provided
federal funding for crime victim compensation programs, victim assistance, and a crime
victims’ fund that was funded from criminal fines, forfeitures, and assessments. A similar
bill was introduced by Republican Representative Hamilton Fish introduced HR 5124, on
March 14, 1984 (Congressional Record 1985, 179). A compromise bill was introduced in
the House, October 2, 1984 (Congressional Record 1985, 181).
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In the Senate, Senator Strom Thurmond (R-SC) introduced Bill 2423 on March
13, 1984. Thurmond described that the federal government legislation could provide a
model to the state governments and assist the states in their efforts on the “the war against
violent crime” (Congressional Record, 1985, 13). Thurmond described five main features
of the Act, as introduced, to include: 1) funding assistance to state victim compensation
programs, 2) funding assistance for state victim assistance programs, 3) improved federal
victim assistance, 4) federal court authority to order “Son of Sam” forfeitures of profits
resulting from crimes, and 5) ensuring victim impact statements may be made at parole
hearings. The Act would create a fund that was funded by criminal fines paid to the
United States and profits that were made through commission of federal crimes.
Senate Bill 2423 was reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee on May 25,
1984. With 12 changes to the bill, the Committee on the Judiciary reported favorably a
“pass” recommendation. Senate Debate on August 10, 1984 reflected support for S2423
however Senator Heinz, a co-sponsor of the bill, expressed concern about the
constitutionality of the “Son of Sam” provision. In addition, Senator Specter offered an
amendment to the bill which called for priority funding for sexual assault, spousal
assault, and child abuse victims. A conference bill was introduced October 10, 1984.
After passage in the House and Senate, the legislation was signed by President Reagan
and subsequently codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 10601.
Since the adoption of the VOCA in 1984, it has undergone some revising. For
example, it was amended in 1988 to establish the Office of Victims of Crime in the
Office of Justice Programs, Department of Justice. In addition, Section 10606 of the Act
was repealed by the Crime Victim’s Rights Act in 2004. Under the presidency of George
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W. Bush, the Crime Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA) was passed in 2004 providing similar
provisions to Section 10606 of VOCA but securing an increased role in the justice
process for victims and affording qualitatively different interactions with victims and the
Department of Justice (Crime Victims’ Rights Act).
The Victims of Crime Act has had a significant impact in certain aspects of
criminal victimization. Davis and Henley detail the growth in victim services program
over a two-decade period, crediting VOCA, in part, for the funding of programs (1990,
157). To be sure, VOCA annual deposits and expenditures represent hundreds of millions
of dollars.
Additional Federal Legislation. During this era, other victim-related legislative
acts were adopted. For example, the 1982 Victim and Witness Protection Act provided
restitution to victims and victim impact statements at the sentencing phase. The 1994
Violence Against Women Act provided funding for victim assistance and prevention
programs for violence against women and children. In 1996, the Mandatory Victims
Restitution Act mandated restitution for specific crimes, and in 1997, the Victim Rights
Clarification Act resolved an issue which emerged from the trial of the Oklahoma City
bombing case, where the court held that victims who may testify in the case may not
observe other parts of the trial.
Crime Victims’ Rights Act (2004). Beyond the historical era of victims’ rights
development outlined in the present study, the federal government continued to provide
protection for crime victims at the federal level. The Justice for All Act passed in the
House of Representatives as H.R. 5107 in 2004. Four sections comprise the Act: Scott
Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston, Louarna Gillis, and Nile Lynn (termed the
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Crime Victims’ Rights Act) which provided for victim participation in federal court
proceedings (Crime Victims’ Rights Act); the Debbie Smith Act of 2004, which provides
state and local governments financial assistance to increase capacity to utilize DNA; the
DNA Sexual Assault Act of 2004 which furthers training for DNA investigations; and the
Innocence Protection Act of 2004, which provides legal and DNA assistance for those
claiming to be innocent (Mastrocinque 2010).
The Senate passed a Crime Victims’ Rights Act in April of 2004 as a compromise
legislation between pro and anti-constitutional amendment forces (H.R. 5107: The Justice
for All Act of 2004). Senate Bill 2329 was introduced by Senator Feinstein (D-CA).
Senator Feinstein described the provisions in Senate Congressional Record April 22,
2004 S4261-4262, including directions to the courts and the Attorney General to ensure
crime victims understand their rights and may exercise them and that they will have the
writ of mandamus to make a timely appeal if their rights are denied.
Senate Bill 2329 was later joined to the DNA and Innocence Protection Acts to be
a component of the Justice for All Act. The American Civil Liberties Union raised
concerns with the Senate version before the House Judiciary Committee - a number of
which were subsequently addressed by the House of Representatives’ version. Among
these, the American Civil Liberties Union expressed concerns that victims who were also
witnesses in the case would have their testimony potentially jeopardized if they were
allowed to attend the entire trial and hear other witness testimony, that victims have the
right to reopen plea agreements, bail, and sentencing hearings if their rights are infringed,
and that victims may have a right to counsel (ACLU). Other concerns expressed by the
American Civil Liberties Union included the expansion of DNA provisions to include
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records of people who had not been convicted of crimes and eliminating federal statutes
of limitations for some crimes (ACLU).
In the House, the Justice for All Act of 2004 was introduced by Representative
James Sensenbrenner Jr. (R-WI) September 21, 2004 as H. R. 5107 and favorably
reported by the House Judiciary Committee on September 22, 2004. Following adoption
of a simple resolution regarding debate, H. Res 824, agreed to on October 6, 2004, it
passed the House, 393 affirmative votes to 14, on the same day. Three days later, on the
9th, it passed the Senate by unanimous vote and was signed into law on October 30, 2004,
by President Bush. It became Pub.L. 108-405.
Federal Constitutional Amendment. Attempts to include a victims’ rights
amendment in the federal constitution involved adding a clause to the Sixth Amendment,
reading, “Likewise, the victim, in every criminal prosecution shall have the right to be
present and to be heard at all critical stages of judicial proceedings’ (President’s Task
Force 1982, 114), although this effort was unsuccessful. In the mid-1990s, interest in
passing an amendment was renewed as several states passed their own constitutional
amendments. Rather than add to the Sixth Amendment, the National Organization of
Victim Assistance (NOVA) recommended an entirely new amendment (Mastrocinque
2010, 102). Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) and Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ) worked for
eight years to create and pass a constitutional amendment but after efforts proved
unsuccessful, reworked the provisions into the federal statutory provisions that resulted in
the 2004 Justice for All Act (Senate Congressional Record). A current Victim’s Rights
Amendment was proposed in 2013 (National Victims Constitutional Amendment
Passage).
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Judicial Actions
In addition to the efforts made by the president and Congress to support victims’
rights, the Supreme Court provided notable support for crime victims in this era. This
evolving recognition of victims’ rights is apparent in decisions of the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts. One of the ways in which the Burger Court reflected this recognition
was through the growth in grants of certiorari in criminal cases which involved
prosecutor requests to have state judicial decisions reversed (O’Neill 1984, 373). Justice
Stevens acknowledged this growing trend in a dissenting opinion in Michigan v. Long,
describing the phenomenon as a recent occurrence yet acknowledging the growth toward
receiving petitions and hearing arguments for these cases (O’Neill 1984, 373).
In the Long case, the Court’s holding asserted that it had jurisdiction in cases
which appeared to rely on federal law unless the state court explicitly indicated it was
relying on independent grounds (O’Neill 1984, 363). Justice Stevens’ dissent in Long
argued that the Court’s involvement in the case was not warranted because a lower court
had not violated the defendant’s constitutional rights (O’Neill 1984, 364). To scholars
such as O’Neill, the implications of this decision are clear: the decision’s effect involves
increasing the number of appeals made by prosecutors to reverse state criminal decisions
(O’Neill 1984, 373). The concern, according to O’Neill, is that such an approach deviates
from the Court’s traditional model of appellate review (O’Neill 1984, 365). In the
traditional model, the Court’s review of criminal cases has involved both a determination
of whether there was a violation of a defendants’ constitutional rights as well as selection
of cases which contribute toward the larger body of case law involving the relationship
between citizens and government. The new model put forth in Long, however, is no
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longer about citizens versus government but one in which the Court recognizes two sets
of citizens (O’Neill 1984, 364). O’Neill indicates, “[T]he Court seems to have viewed the
criminal case as an opportunity to adjudicate the respective constitutional rights of the
law-abiding (“good citizens”) and the criminals (“bad citizens”)” (O’Neill 1984, 364).
According to O’Neill, the Court’s representation is one in which the interest of criminal
defendants and of crime victims involve a “zero-sum game” where a win for one is a loss
for the other (1984, 364).
In addition to the Court’s signal in Long toward adopting a new approach to
appellate review, cases in the 1982 term explicitly illustrated the recognition of victims’
interests. For example, in United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983) the Court
reversed the Seventh Circuit’s decision to grant a new trial to a defendant on the grounds
that there was prosecutorial misconduct; in the majority opinion, Chief Justice Burger
indicated the Seventh Circuit Court failed to consider the traumatic impact a new trial
would have on the victims (O’Neill 1984, 380).
The Rehnquist Court’s consideration of victims’ interests also provides an
important understanding for the change in policy toward victims. Cases which involve
crime victims’ ability to submit victim impact statements at trial emerged early in
Rehnquist’s tenure as Chief Justice. The Supreme Court considered victim impact
statements in Booth v. Maryland, 482 US 496 (1987). The Booth case involved a
Maryland statute which allowed family members of the victims to submit victim impact
statements in the pre-sentencing report. In this case, John Booth was convicted for
murdering and robbing Irvin and Rose Bronstein and was sentenced to death by a jury.
The victim impact statement made by the family included a description of the victims and
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the impact of the murders on surviving family members as well as characterizations of
the defendant and the crimes of which he was convicted. The trial court denied a motion
to suppress the statement. The Court of Appeals for the State of Maryland found that a
victim impact statement was an important component of information useful to sentencing.
The question before the Supreme Court was whether a victim impact statement,
considered by a jury in the sentencing phase of a capital case, violates the Eighth
Amendment guarantee from cruel and unusual punishment. A 5 to 4 majority found that
it did. The Court held that, except where such evidence related to the circumstances of
the crime, sentencing information should focus on defendant’s crime rather than the
attributes of the victims or emotional suffering of the family. According to the majority
opinion, consideration of such emotional testimony is inflammatory and thwarts the
efforts of the jury to arrive at “reasoned decisionmaking” (at 482 U.S. 508-509).
The Court took up a related issue two years later in South Carolina v. Gathers,
490 U.S. 805 (1989). In the Gathers case, respondent Gathers was convicted of murder
and first degree criminal sexual conduct after he attacked Richard Haynes in a park.
Gathers was subsequently sentenced to death. At the sentencing phase of trial, the
prosecutor’s closing arguments involved a lengthy description of Haynes’ religiousness
and dedication to community, as indicated by the presence and content of items among
his belongings. The Supreme Court of South Carolina relied on the opinion in Booth v.
Maryland that indicated that the sentence for a capital crime must focus on the
defendant’s responsibility in its reversal of the death sentence that had been previously
imposed. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed that decision, dismissing the State’s
argument that the personal belongings were related to the circumstances of the crime, and
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finding that the items were irrelevant to the defendant’s responsibility (490 U.S. 812).
Although Justice Kennedy joined the Court to replace the outgoing Justice Powell, author
of the majority opinion in Booth, the Gathers case involved another 5 to 4 majority where
Justice White, a dissenter in Booth, voted with the majority in Gathers (O’Brien 2008,
1177).
A notable development that occurred following the Booth and Gathers case
involved changing personnel on the Court, as Justice Brennan, an Eisenhower nominee,
who voted in the majority in Booth, retired in 1990, and was replaced by Justice Souter (a
Bush nominee, who joined the majority in the Payne case to overturn Booth).
In 1991, the U.S. Supreme Court again considered a case involving a victim
impact statements in the sentencing phase of capital trials. Pervis Payne was convicted of
the murder of 28-year-old Charisse Christopher and her 2-year-old daughter Lacie.
Charisse’s mother provided a victim impact statement that described the effect of the
victim’s death on her surviving 3-year-old son which was also referenced by the
prosecutor in closing arguments. Payne was sentenced to death and subsequently and
unsuccessfully argued that the statements were impermissible in a capital case. However,
in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991), the Supreme Court reversed its earlier ruling
in Booth v. Maryland and South Carolina v. Gathers and held that the Eighth
Amendment does not prohibit a jury from considering evidence of victim impact in the
sentencing phase of a capital trial. The majority in the Payne case was six to three, with
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivering the opinion of the Court. The Court dismissed the
reasoning made in Booth and Gathers; that is, that evidence of victim harm or victim
attributes are not relevant to the “blameworthiness” of a defendant; rather, the Court’s
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opinion highlights the fact that the testimony presented by the defense involved numerous
statements regarding the character of the defendant which should be similarly considered
irrelevant to the circumstances of Payne’s crime. Chief Justice Rehnquist underscores this
point, quoting the Tennessee Supreme Court,
[i]t is an affront to the civilized members of the human race to say that at
sentencing in a capital case, a parade of witnesses may praise the
background, character and good deed of Defendant (as was done in this
case), without limitation as to relevancy, but nothing may be said that
bears upon the character of, or the harm imposed, upon the victims.
The Rehnquist Court also considered victims’ interests as they implicated the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment in the 1990 case, Maryland v. Craig,
497 U.S. 836. In this case, a six-year-old victim of sexual abuse had been allowed to
testify against a pre-school operator, the alleged perpetrator, via a one-way closed-circuit
television. The defendant, the defense attorney, and jury could view the child’s testimony
and the defense could make objections. The defendant was convicted in the trial court.
However, the state Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the state had
not met the necessary threshold in determining the child would suffer emotional distress
if participating in two-way testimony. In a 5-4 opinion, however, the U.S. Supreme Court
reversed. Justice O’Connor delivered the opinion of the Court, indicating,
Maryland’s interest in protecting child witnesses from the trauma of testifying in a
child abuse case is sufficiently important to justify the use of its special
procedure, provided that the State makes an adequate showing of necessity in an
individual case.
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V. State Actions Supporting Victims’ Rights
In addition to federal responses to victims’ rights, states also responded to
Reagan’s Task Force Final Report with policy adoptions. Such responses included
adopting provisions for victim impact statements during the sentencing phase of the trial
as well as passing bills of rights for crime victims in state statutes (Mastrocinque 2010,
98).
Furthermore, some states provided victim rights as amendments to their
constitution, with the earliest adoption in 1982 by the State of California. The Victim’s
Constitutional Amendment Network formed in 1987 to coordinate this effort
(Mastrocinque 2010, 98) but Mastrocinque also credits responses made by victim
organizations within the states to the Task Force recommendations (2010, 101).
Although two-thirds of the states adopted a constitutional amendment within this
historical era referred to as the victims’ rights movement, several other states have more
recently adopted a victims’ rights amendment and still others are currently considering
adoption. Furthermore, some states which had already adopted a victims’ rights
constitutional amendment have undergone, or are considering, revision of the original
amendments. For example, although the states of California and Florida passed
constitutional victims’ rights in 1982 and 1988, each has also adopted a subsequent
revision of constitutional crime victims’ rights. In 2008, California was the first state to
pass “Marsy’s Law,” a comprehensive set of victims’ rights which subsequently became
model policy for several other states. Florida passed Marsy’s Law ten years later in 2018.
Marsy’s Law was created by Dr. Henry T. Nicholas III following his family’s experience
with the justice system after the murder of his sister, Marsalee Ann Nicholas (Marsy’s
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Law). Since California’s passage of Marsy’s Law, the legislation has been passed by
several other states, including, Florida (2018), Georgia (2018), Illinois (2014), Kentucky
(2020), Nevada (2018), North Carolina (2018), North Dakota (2016), Ohio (2017),
Oklahoma (2018), Pennsylvania (2019), South Dakota (2016), and Wisconsin (2020) and
adoption of the legislation is being currently pursued in states such as Idaho, Maine,
Mississippi, New Hampshire, and Tennessee (Marsy’s Law). Montana and Kentucky
passed a Marsy’s Law in 2016 and 2018, respectively, but the legislation was
subsequently overturned. Kentucky succeeded in passing the legislation again in
November 2020. In Pennsylvania, the recently passed legislation is undergoing review by
the courts to determine constitutionality.

VI. Victims’ Rights Amendments Provisions
Within the constitutional amendments adopted by states, victims’ rights vary in
regard to the rights afforded to the victim. A cursory exploration of the Victim Law
database, provided by the Office of Victims of Crime, illustrates differences in the
provisions adopted by each state. An examination of these provisions may contribute to a
greater understanding of victims’ rights constitutional amendments and their adoption.
The Victim Law database, available at https://www.victimlaw.org/, categorizes
victims’ rights under the topics of 1) the right to attend, 2) the right to be heard; 3) the
right to be informed; 4) the right to protection; 5) the right to privacy; 6) the right to
request compensation; 7) the right to restitution; 8) the right to return of property; 9) the
right to speedy trial; and 10) the right to enforcement.
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Within each of these rights, the Victim Law database further sub-categorizes each
provision. For example, the right to be informed is further differentiated into the
subcategories of “notice of information” (such as in regard to the criminal justice process,
the status of the defendant, as well as rights and benefits available to the victim); “review
or obtain information” (such as in regard to requesting contact or additional information);
and “victim notification systems” (such as referencing the mechanism by which victims
receive information). (See Table 3.1 for Categories and Sub-categories of Select Victims’
Rights).
Table 3.1 Categories and Sub-categories of Select Victims’ Rights
(Source: Victim Law database)

Right to Attend
Proceedings
Victim cannot be excluded as
witness
Presence of support
Employment protections

Right to be Informed
Notice of information
Review or obtain
information
Victim notification
systems

Right to be Heard
Confer with prosecutor
Communicate with court
or other
Communicate with
defendant

An examination of provisions in the database illustrate policy variations in the
states. For example, some states adopted weaker policy provisions than others. For the
right to attend, a state such as Rhode Island represented the weaker end of the spectrum
and a state such as Michigan represented the stronger end while most states fell in
between. In general, the Rhode Island provision was also shorter than that of Michigan
and did not explicitly include certain provisions, such as the right to a timely disposition
of the case and the right to confer with a prosecutor (See Appendix B for Rhode Island
and Michigan provisions). The weak-strong differences between states varied, to some
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extent, by right, in that a state, such as New Jersey, which reflected a stronger right to
attend, reflected weak provisions for the right to be informed. The New Jersey provision
represented a weak right to be informed while the state of Arizona represented a strong
one (See Appendix B for New Jersey and Arizona provisions).

VII. Conclusion
Growing dissatisfaction with the justice system and crime rates, the development
of the women’s movement and victim activism, and additional factors present in the latter
part of the twentieth century, culminated in a response by both the federal government
and state governments to increase victims’ rights protections. These have included both
financial assistance for federal and state victims as well as efforts to expand the role of
victims in the justice process. Acknowledgement and advancement of victims’ rights
occurred within each of the three branches of the federal government – including
presidential pronouncements, Congressional legislation, and Supreme Court rulings.
States responded to the call for victims’ rights by adopting statutory provisions for
victims’ rights as well as the adoption of constitutional victims’ rights in the majority of
states. Of those states that adopted constitutional protections for victims, provisions vary.
Although the importance of victims’ rights has been widely accepted by the states as well
as having received bipartisan support at the federal level, the social construction of
victims and criminals as a justification for justice system policies has been met with
criticism and concern for its effect on incarceration rates and disparate impact on racial
minorities.
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Chapter 4: Presidential Rhetoric as a Federal Variable
I. Introduction
To assess the influence of presidential rhetoric in the states, I construct a variable
which includes the degree to which states are more (or less) inclined to be influenced by
the presidential words. This variable is an indexed value of a measure of presidential
rhetoric, derived from a content analysis of presidential documents, and a measure of
state receptivity to presidential rhetoric, derived from state presidential election results.
This chapter details the construction of this variable.

II. Study Design
The first component of the study involved a content analysis of presidential
documents to assess presidential rhetoric concerning crime victims. Previous studies
assessing the influence of presidential rhetoric have taken varying approaches but a
common component to many is assessing the frequency of the president’s words. For
example, Cohen (1995) and Hill (1998) used the frequency of references to particular
policies occurring in presidential State of the Union addresses across the study period.
These were then counted and expressed in percentages of the total number of sentences in
the State of the Union. The present analysis takes a similar approach by identifying
pronouncements made by the president in acknowledgement or support of domestic
crime victims which are reasoned to support to promote victims’ rights policies.
However, unlike Cohen’s study which expresses references in percentages, the present
study considers total number of individual references. I reasoned that because references
to victimization may reflect emotional sentiment, a greater number of references may
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suggest a greater emotional response and heightened likelihood to support a particular
policy adoption. Thus, I reasoned using the total number of references would represent a
more precise measurement of the significance of the policy issue.
Previous scholarship in assessing the influence of presidential rhetoric on
dependent variables, such as the adoption of policy, has been conducted through different
types of analyses, such as time series regression, but few have involved event history
analyses. However, Karch’s 2012 study evaluating the influence of presidential
speechmaking on embryonic stem cell policies advancing to state political agendas takes
this approach. Karch’s analysis used dichotomous variables to represent the years in
which President Bush’s speech occurred and subsequent debate ensued. The present
study takes a similar approach as Karch’s representation in coding for occurrences by
year, but rather than dichotomous variables, the present study sought to represent varying
degrees of presidential rhetoric by coding for a range of values.
The analysis involved the review of thousands of presidential documents,
including verbatim transcripts of news conferences, interviews, weekly and State of the
Union addresses, statements, and proclamations between the period of 1981 and 2001.
These documents were selected as they were reasoned to have a greater likelihood of
reaching the public. I excluded documents from the analysis that were reasoned to be less
likely to reach the public, such as comments made at eulogies, state dinners,
correspondent dinners, and miscellaneous remarks. The study focused on the manifest
content of presidential documents and the explicit use of the word victim. This was done
to maximize reliability of the coding. Furthermore, coding of the documents was
conducted by a single rater to reduce concerns about inter-rater reliability. The review of
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documents involved both an investigation into the depth and breadth of the use of the
word “victim.” Values were coded for each year of the study period. After coding,
executive orders were subsequently removed from the study as there were no references
to the word victim during the study period. These presidential documents were accessed
at the American Presidency Project, a database maintained by the University of
California at Santa Barbara.
The second component of the study involved the coding of state presidential
election results subsequent to those years in the study. Presidential election results were
used as a measurement of sensitivity of the states to represent states which are reasoned
to be more (or less) attuned to presidential rhetoric. This approach was reasoned to reflect
retrospective approval for the president’s term in office.

III. Methods and Results
To conduct a content analysis, the study identified those presidential documents
which referred to crime victims. This was achieved by performing a keyword search
through word processing software. Initially, both the keywords “victim” and “crime”
were included in the study as separate searches. Although the keyword victim was the
central focus of the content analysis, the keyword crime was included for initial analysis
to gain a sense of how it may have been used in conjunction with the word victim. After a
cursory analysis suggested the two words were not used interchangeably, results from the
keyword search for crime were excluded. (See Keyword Crime Coding Methods in
Appendix C).
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Keyword searches were initially performed on the titles of the documents.
Documents such as presidential proclamations and presidential statements were found to
offer sufficiently specific titles to make searching by title a reasonable approach. Because
the titles of news conferences, interviews, and addresses often did not reflect the
substantive content of the document, however, the keyword searches of those documents
were expanded to include the full content of the document. Keyword searches of
presidential documents were reviewed to determine whether the keywords located were
related to the subject of domestic crime victims or victimization. For example, a keyword
search of the word victim found that the term was used by President Reagan in a January
9, 1985, news conference to refer to victims of domestic crime in the United States.
Reagan indicated,

I don't blame the police so much for what we've seen over the years as a kind of
an attitude in the whole structure of judicial and everyplace else in crime in which
it seemed that we got overzealous in protecting the criminals' rights and forgot
about the victim. And I think if we have stricter enforcement and stricter
punishment, we'll continue to see decline in crime.

Keyword searches that returned results but did not reference domestic crime
victims were excluded from the study’s further consideration by indicating an exclusion
on the original data coding sheets. For example, a search of the word victim returned
results which included a reference to victims on June 18 of the same year. However, in
this case, President Reagan referred to victims of the Trans World Airlines hijacking,
rather than victims of domestic crime. Thus, while the former positive search return was
coded 1, as a relevant reference to this study because it referenced domestic crime
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victims, the latter positive search return was coded 0, as an irrelevant reference to this
study because it did not reference domestic crime victims. There were several situations
in which exclusions applied. As indicated in the above example, references to the word
victim were excluded when referencing disease or disaster victims, or victims of violence
that occurred outside of the United States. Even when American citizens were victimized
by crime occurring outside of the United States, the keyword search return was excluded
because it did not appear to represent a domestic crime situation which implicated
domestic crime policy and which, in turn, could implicate the possible adoption of a state
crime victims’ constitutional amendment. References to the word victim were excluded if
they were made by any person other than the president, for example, when made by a
reporter or another political figure (such as a foreign prime minister). Referring to a
person or persons as a “victim” of objectionable treatment (such as a victim of the media
or of politics) was coded 0 as non-relevant and subsequently excluded from
consideration.

Breadth and Depth of the Word Victim
The second step was to tabulate the data. Two approaches were taken – one which
sought to reflect the breadth of the use of the word victim by tallying the number of
different presidential documents that used the word victim, and the other which sought to
reflect the depth of the use of the word victim by tallying the number of times the word
victim was used across reviewed presidential documents in a given period. Each
approach was reasoned to be a meaningful representation of prioritizing a concept in
rhetorical communication. The breadth of the message is important because the greater
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number of avenues where a president communicates may increase the likelihood that the
message is received. Presidential news conferences, interviews, weekly addresses,
proclamations, statements, and the State of the Union address may, to some degree, reach
somewhat different audiences thus expanding the reach of the president’s message.
Additionally, utilizing a larger number of forms of communication might increase the
likelihood that a message that fails to reach an audience through one avenue might be
received through another.
The depth of the use of the word victim is also important because the greater use
of the word may communicate a greater significance to a concept. Thus, a president’s
rhetoric utilizing a repeated word, such as victim, may communicate the importance of a
concept to the president’s values and priorities. Because both the breadth and depth of the
use of the word victim are valuable considerations, the study method utilized an amalgam
of both measures.
Breadth of the Use of the Word Victim. Assessing the breadth of the use of the
word victim involved tallying the number of documents that included the reference.
Figure 4.1 displays the frequency distributions of documents containing the word victim
for each year between 1982 and 2001. As indicated in the table, the year 2000 had the
greatest number of presidential documents which referenced victims in relation to
domestic crime. The years 1996 and 1997 had the second and third greatest numbers,
respectively. Years 1986 and 1992 each contained zero presidential documents
referencing crime victims.
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An ordering in of the values represented in Figure 4.1 further illustrates the
frequency. The range of scores was 0 to 10. Measures of central tendency included a
mean value of 4.55, a median of 4.5 and a mode of 5.
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Once the frequency distribution of documents containing the word victim was
tabulated, the scores were ranked by intensity from Low to High. Years that had 0 to 2
references were considered Low and coded as 0, years with 3 to 6 references were
considered Moderate and coded as 1, and years that had 7 to 10 references were
considered High and coded 2. The cutoff points for each category were established by
considering the distribution of the values. (See Table 4.1 for intensity of documents by
year.)

Table 4.1 Documents Containing Word Victim Intensity Score by Year

Intensity
Score
Coding

Low (0-2)
0

Years

1981, 1986,
1987, 1992

Moderate (3-6)
1
1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1989,
1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995,
1998, 1999, 2001

High (7-10)
2
1988, 1996,
1997, 2000

In addition to the total number of documents containing the word victim, data also
included the totals of documents by type of document. This information is useful in the
consideration of the nature of different types of presidential rhetorical communication.
For example, modes of communication such as weekly addresses, proclamations and
statements occur with a greater frequency than a presidential State of the Union address,
which only regularly occurs on an annual basis. Figure 4.3 illustrates that in several years
across the study, presidential addresses accounted for the type of document which most
frequently included the word victim. For example, in year 1988, which had a total of
seven references to the word victim, six of those were found in presidential addresses
while one occurred in a presidential proclamation. In year 2000, which represented the
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year which had the most references to the word victim, (a total of 10), presidential
statements accounted for half of those references, with a total of five. Weekly addresses
had a total of three. News conferences and presidential addresses each had one reference.

Figure 4.3 Frequency of Document Containing Word Victim by Type of Document

Depth of the Use of the Word Victim. Assessing the depth of the use of the word
victim involved tallying the total number of references to the word victim across all
documents reviewed in the study per year. That is, if the president referred to victims
twice in (a) presidential address(es), once in a statement, three times in (a) news
conference(s), and zero times in the remaining formats (State of the Union, interviews,
and proclamations) in a particular year, the tallied number for that year would be six.
Figure 4.4 displays the frequency distributions of references to the word victim for each
year between 1982 and 2001. As indicated in the table, the year 1996 had the greatest
number of references to the word victim in relation to domestic crime, with a total of 55.
The years 2000 and 1997 had the second and third greatest numbers, respectively. Year
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1992 had zero references to the word victim.

Figure 4.4 Frequency of Word Victim

An ordering in of values in Figure 4.5 further illustrates the frequency. The range
of scores was 0 to 55. Measures of central tendency include a mean value of 21.9, a
median of 21, and a mode of 21.

Figure 4.5 Ordered Values of Frequency of Word Victim
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Once the scores for the frequency of the word victim were tabulated, they were
ranked by intensity from Low to High. Years that had 0 to 14 references were considered
Low and coded as 0, years with 15 to 24 references were considered Moderate and coded
as 1, and years that had 25 to 55 references were considered High and coded 2. The
cutoff points for each category were established by considering the distribution of the
values. (See Table 4.2 for Use of Word Victim Intensity Scores by Year.)

Table 4.2 Use of Word Victim Intensity Scores by Year

Score
Coding

Low (0-14)
0

Moderate (15-24)
1

Years

1983, 1986,
1992

1982, 1984, 1985, 1987, 1988, 1989,
1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 1999, 2001

High (25-55)
2
1991, 1994,
1996, 1997,
2000

In addition to the total number of references to the word victim, data also included
these totals by type of document. Figure 4.6 demonstrates that in several years across the
study, presidential proclamations contained the most references to the word victim
compared to the other types of documents in the study. The year with the greatest number
of references to the word victim was 1996 which had 55 references – 36 of which
occurred in presidential addresses and 17 of which occurred in presidential
proclamations. Only one year, 1992, had no references to the word victim.
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Figure 4.6 Frequency of Word Victim by Type of Document

Once the data on the breadth and depth of the use of the victim were tallied and
scored, the values were summed. For example, a year which received a score of Moderate
(1) in Frequency of a Document Containing the Word Victim and High (2) in Frequency
of the Word Victim received a score of 3. Sums were obtained for each of the twenty
years in the study.

State Receptivity to Presidential Rhetoric
Because presidential rhetoric is generally experienced by all of the states to the
same degree, the study sought to capture a measurement of sensitivity of the states to
recognize those states which are reasoned to be more (or less) inclined to pay attention to
the president’s statements. For example, a traditionally “red” state might be reasoned to
be more inclined to pay attention to the rhetoric of a Republican president than a “blue”
state. To capture this sensitivity, the study initially considered utilizing presidential
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approval rates by the states; however, data was unavailable as organizations such as
Gallup did not record this data by state during the time period of this study. Instead,
subsequent election results were used to represent state support of a president. Because
elections have been commonly found to represent assessments of a president’s
performance, electoral support at the end of the term reflects a measure of presidential
approval.
Using the Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections database, available at
www.uselectionatlas.org, the results of each election between the years 1984 and 2004
were recorded. Presidential support was represented by the percentage of voters who
voted for the winning candidate (or candidate’s party, if power had since changed). For
example, results from the 1984 election, which reelected Ronald Reagan, were
retroactively applied to Years 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1984 to represent that state’s level
of support. Thus, in 1984, because 60.54 percent of Alabama voters voted for Reagan, the
value of 60.54 was marked for Alabama for each of those years. For election years where
a member of a president’s party wins, such as in 1988 when George H. W. Bush
succeeded Ronald Reagan, the percentage of support Bush received from voters in the
1988 election, was used to represent the support for Reagan’s last term (years 1985,
1986, 1987 and 1988). This was justified as it was reasoned that party candidates were
likelier than not to approach crime victim’s policy with a similar position.
The support for presidents in this time period ranged from 30 to 70 percent.
Values were scored on intensity of presidential support from Low (up to 43 percent),
Moderate (43 to 56 percent) and High (56 percent and higher). See Table 4.3 State
Receptivity to Presidential Rhetoric for results.
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Table 4.3 State Receptivity to Presidential Rhetoric

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina

1981-84
High
High
High
High
Mod
High
High
Mod
High
High
Mod
High
Mod
High
Mod
High
High
High
High
Mod
Mod
High
Mod
High
High
High
High
High
High
High
High
Mod
High
High
Mod
High
Mod
Mod
Mod
High

1985-88
High
High
High
Mod
Mod
Mod
Mod
Mod
High
High
Mod
High
Mod
High
Mod
Mod
Mod
Mod
Mod
Mod
Mod
Mod
Mod
Mod
Mod
Mod
High
Mod
High
Mod
Mod
Mod
Mod
Mod
Mod
Mod
Mod
Mod
Mod
High

1989-92
Mod
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Mod
Low
Low
Mod
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Mod
Mod
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Mod

1993-96
Mod
Low
Mod
Mod
Mod
Mod
Mod
Mod
Mod
Mod
Mod
Low
Mod
Low
Mod
Low
Mod
Mod
Mod
Mod
High
Mod
Mod
Mod
Mod
Low
Low
Mod
Mod
Mod
Mod
High
Mod
Low
Mod
Low
Mod
Mod
High
Mod

1997-00
Low
Low
Mod
Mod
Mod
Low
Mod
Mod
Mod
Low
Mod
Low
Mod
Low
Mod
Low
Low
Mod
Mod
Mod
High
Mod
Mod
Low
Mod
Low
Low
Mod
Mod
Mod
Mod
High
Mod
Low
Mod
Low
Mod
Mod
High
Low

2001-02
High
High
Mod
Mod
Mod
Mod
Low
Mod
Mod
Mod
Low
High
Mod
High
Mod
High
High
Mod
Mod
Low
Low
Mod
Mod
High
Mod
High
High
Mod
Mod
Mod
Mod
Low
Mod
Mod
Mod
High
Mod
Mod
Mod
High
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South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

High
Mod
High
High
Mod
High
Mod
Mod
Mod
High

Mod
Mod
Mod
High
Mod
High
Mod
Mod
Mod
High

Low
Low
Low
Mod
Low
Mod
Low
Low
Low
Low

Mod
Mod
Mod
Low
Mod
Mod
Mod
Mod
Mod
Low

Low
Mod
Low
Low
Mod
Mod
Mod
Mod
Mod
Low

High
High
High
High
Low
Mod
Mod
Mod
Mod
High

Notably, the candidacy of Ross Perot in 1992 and, to a similar but lesser degree in
1996, created a condition where the values of support for the ultimate election victor
were often in the Low category of 30 percent. Despite this, the values for this period were
not adjusted for the influence of Ross Perot as it was reasoned that the values were
accurate representations of the support for the president. Another approach would have
been to remove the Perot influence of the numbers to create numbers more similar to a
typical election involving the two major party candidates.
After intensity scores were assigned to each state for each of the years considered
within the study, the values were multiplied with the summed value of the breadth and
depth of the word victim in presidential rhetoric to achieve a final value representing the
presidential rhetoric federal variable for each state for each of the years in the study. This
variable tells us that the influence of presidential rhetoric in the states is a factor of the
degree to which particular language is used (in this case, the word victim) and the degree
to which a state expresses presidential approval. Figure 4.7 illustrates the expression of
the presidential rhetoric variable.
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Figure 4.7 Presidential Rhetoric Variable

IV. Conclusion
This content analysis sought to develop a variable representing action on the part
of the federal government through the use of presidential rhetoric using the results of a
content analysis of thousands of presidential documents throughout the study timeframe.
Both the breadth of the use of the word victim as well as the depth of the use victim were
measured. These values were then indexed with a measure of retroactively applied
election results for the victor in presidential elections throughout the period of the study
as a representation of a state’s “receptivity” to presidential rhetoric. The event history
analysis described in Chapter 5 employed each state’s value that occurred in the year the
state either adopted the policy or in the final year of the study if a state did not adopt
during the study time period.

71

Chapter 5: Event History Analysis of State Victims’ Rights Amendments Adoption
I. Research Questions and Hypotheses
In this chapter, I conduct an event history analysis to discern causal inferences in
the adoption of state-level victims’ rights constitutional amendments. I examine the
influence of presidential rhetoric on the adoption of these amendments, questioning
whether presidential rhetoric focused on crime victims, among other covariates,
influenced the adoption of state constitutional crime victims’ rights amendments. In the
sections to follow, I outline and justify the study hypotheses, detail coding methods, and
analyze data through a preliminary non-parametric process as well as through semiparametric regression models. I have utilized a series of data analysis approaches to
improve the reliability of the results.

Federal Influence
It makes sense to investigate the influence of the federal government on state
policymaking. The constrained nature of federal power limits the federal government
from acting directly in some policy domains. As such, states may be regarded as more
inviting arenas to pursue policy change. For example, scholars have identified that states
may enact policies because passing federal law is a difficult process due to partisanship
and multiple veto points (Dinan and Krane 2006). In a constitutional sense, this may be
due to the “reverence” that makes federal constitutional change anathema to
policymakers, or due to the “negative” rights embodied in the due process protections of
the Bill of Rights and the positive nature of victims’ rights. In addition to the positive
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quality of victims’ rights, arguments within the Supreme Court cases illustrate that
victims’ rights can be seen as implicating the rights of defendants which are preserved in
the due process amendments of the Bill of Rights. For these reasons, it may be especially
difficult to pass such a law at the federal level. Krane (2007) similarly describes the
motivation of states to adopt policies that can fill the void created when the federal
government does not act or when federal policy is deemed unsatisfactory. With these
considerations, this study will examine the influence of federal actions in support of
crime victims’ rights on the adoption of state constitutional victims’ rights amendments.
Each of the three branches of the federal government have provided signals to the
states in regard to victims’ rights. President Reagan’s Task Force Report is credited with
promoting state adoption of provisions for victim impact statements during the
sentencing phase of the trial, as well as passage of bills of rights for crime victims in state
statutes (Mastrocinque 2010, 98). In addition to executive influence, there is evidence
suggesting Congress has sought to influence state crime victims’ policy. The 2004 Crime
Victims Right Act illustrates an attempt to influence the states. Senator Feinstein
indicated at Senate Bill 2329’s introduction,

This act, of course, binds only the federal system, but is designed
to affect the states also. First it is hoped that states will look to this
law as a model and incorporate it into their own systems (Senate
Congressional Record, April 22, 2004, S4262).
It is feasible, also, to suggest that the federal judiciary’s actions in regard to crime
victims provide important cues to the states at its simplest because the determination of
the constitutionality of laws by the highest court provides legal guidelines to the states.
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The Supreme Court has, indeed, ruled on the constitutionality of victims’ rights
provisions such as victim impact statements. In Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991),
the Supreme Court reversed its earlier ruling in Booth v. Maryland (1987) and South
Carolina v. Gathers (1989) and held that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit a jury
from considering evidence of victim impact in the sentencing phase of a capital trial.
The support for crime victims’ rights signaled by the three branches of the federal
government drives the theory of the present study. However, because a study of federal
influence of the three branches may require different approaches to study design, only
one branch will be considered in this study. The influence of the federal government
through the rhetoric of the president representing the executive branch will be the focus
of the present study. Presidential rhetoric is the focus of the study because the president,
as the single-most visible political actor in the United States, is reasoned to possess the
ability to make issues salient and place them on the political agenda. Although a federal
actor, high-profile presidential pronouncements may influence the states as the president
provides cues to which policy issues should be considered important.

Hypotheses
The present study will be testing seven hypotheses. While the main theoretical
question of the study involves the influence of presidential rhetoric on the adoption of
state constitutional amendments, alternative factors are included to provide a
comprehensive analysis. The factors considered are those which have been theorized, in
other contexts, to affect policy adoption and may be relevant in the case of the adoption
of victims’ rights constitutional amendments. These include party control of the state
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government as well as the alternative condition of an electorally competitive state
government; state crime incidence, the strength of interest groups within a state, the level
of innovation of a state, and the legislative structure of a state that makes it more (or less)
easy to pass an amendment.
Objective #1 will be to examine the study’s main theoretical concern, that of the
relationship between presidential rhetoric and the adoption of state crime victims’
constitutional amendments. Specifically, Hypothesis #1 states:

H1: If, through rhetoric, the president acknowledges domestic crime victims,
then it is more likely a state will adopt a state crime victims’ constitutional amendment.

Republican Party Control. To create a comprehensive analysis, additional factors,
such as political ideology, are also considered. Thus, Objective #2 examines the influence
of political party control on the adoption of constitutional amendments by states.
Although crime victims’ policies have often enjoyed bipartisan support as well as
sizeable citizen support, it is reasonable to suggest a relationship between the ideological
basis for victims’ rights as grounded with the Republican party. To be sure, Republican
president Ronald Reagan is recognized as a champion for crime victims. According to a
2005 Office for Victims of Crime report, “President Reagan literally put crime victims'
rights, needs and concerns on the American agenda of public safety and public health
concerns. He established clearly and convincingly that victims' rights are human rights
that affect us all” (Office of Victims of Crime, 2005). McCormack recognizes the
significance of the contributions of Republicans at the federal level as well, indicating,
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Since the mid-1960s the United States Congress has considered and
rejected numerous bills to compensate victims of crime. Progress was not
made at the national level until the Republican administrations of the
1980s embraced the victims’ movement as a natural extension of their
conservative philosophy opposing criminal offenders (McCormack 1994,
214).

Thus, it is reasonable to anticipate a relationship between Republican control of
state governments and policies which may be regarded as consistent with those of federal
Republican administrations.
Hypothesis #2 indicates,

H2: If the Republican Party is in control of the state government, then a state is
more likely to produce crime victims’ constitutional amendments.

Electoral Competition. An alternative, converse hypothesis to the hypothesis that
Republican controlled state governments are more likely to produce victims’ rights
constitutional amendments, is the idea that electorally competitive state governments are
more likely to produce victims’ rights constitutional amendments. Such a hypothesis may
call into question the assumption of whether victims’ rights should be regarded as more
aligned with conservative, or Republican, values. Toward this assessment, Objective #3
examines the relationship between electoral competition and the adoption of crime
victims’ constitutional amendments. The association between electoral competition rests
on the assumption of the need of state government to respond to electoral demand. This
assumption is articulated by Holbrook and Van Dunk, who indicate, “[E]lected officials
in competitive areas will be highly responsive to constituency needs, due to the risk of
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electoral defeat” (Holbrook and Van Dunk 1993, 955). During periods of increased
competition, parties should have greater incentive to respond to proposals that are
favored by high percentages of the public. As indicated, an examination of constitutional
amendments that have passed indicate that they have frequently been adopted with high
percentages of support. Thus, consideration of the influence of electoral competition in
the adoption of constitutional rights amendments is warranted.
Specifically, Hypothesis #3 predicts:

H3: If electoral competition within a state is high, then a legislature is more
likely to pass a crime victims’ constitutional amendments.

Crime. Objective #4 will examine the relationship between state crime rate peaks
and the adoption of crime victims’ constitutional rights. The development of victims’
rights policies occurred during a notable increase in crime rates in the latter decades of
the twentieth century. Increases in crime are reasoned to be attended with concern over
growing crime victimization and policies associated with victimization. States which are
experiencing high levels of crime may experience heightened levels of citizen and
governmental concern over victimization and, thus, would be more likely to produce
crime victims’ rights policies.
Hypothesis #4 predicts:

H4: If a state is experiencing a peak in its crime rate, then that state is more
likely to pass a crime victims’ constitutional amendment.
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Interest Groups. Objective #5 considers the relationship between the strength of
interest groups within a state and the passage of state crime victims’ constitutional
amendments. As scholars attributed the growth of victim groups in the development of
victims’ rights, it is reasoned that the strength of groups in the states may be related to the
adoption of amendments to state constitutions (Mastrocinque 2010, 101). It is reasoned
that a state with a history of strong interest group influence would be more at-risk of
adopting a policy pursued by victim organizations. Although reasonable, this concept is
also somewhat problematic because it is possible that “strong” interest groups could
either promote the adoption of crime victims’ policies or thwart the adoption of crime
victims’ policies. For example, even though the development of victims’ rights
organizations suggests a possible role in producing policy change, it is also possible that
opposing interest groups, such as those representing the interests of defendants, may be
concerned about the effect crime victims’ rights have on their members and work to
thwart the efforts of victims’ groups. While the strength of victim interest groups in each
state would provide a more ideal measurement than the strength of interest groups in
general, to my knowledge, this data is unavailable.
The strength of interest groups will utilize coding scores from the ThomasHrebenar categories where Thomas and Hrebenar classified the strength of interest
groups relative to other policymaking aspects within a state. These categorizations range
from 1) dominant, 2) dominant/complementary; 3) complementary; 4)
complementary/subordinate; 5) subordinate, where dominant represents the greatest
magnitude of influence and subordinate represents the least.
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Thus, Hypothesis #5 indicates:

H5: If interest groups within a state are strong, then a state is more likely to
pass a crime victims’ constitutional amendment.

Innovation. Objective #6 will examine the relationship between a state’s degree of
innovation and the adoption of crime victims’ constitutional amendments. Walker (1969)
studied state adoption of policies and scored states along the degree to which it was a
leader in policy adoption. Such states are said to be innovative. A state which is likely to
lead other states in policy adoption is reasoned to also lead other states in the adoption of
crime victims’ state constitutional amendments. Specifically, Hypothesis #6 predicts:

H6: If a state is considered a policy innovator, then the state is more likely to
pass a crime victims’ constitutional amendment.

Legislative Structure. State constitutions can be amended in a number of ways,
which vary from state to state, but which generally involve a legislatively initiated
amendment that is approved by a certain threshold of voters, an initiative brought by and
approved by the voters, or through the calling of a constitutional convention.5 As state
amendment procedures vary, so does the degree of difficulty in passing amendments.
Objective #7 examines the influence of the differences in state institutions that may

5

Delaware allows the legislature to adopt a constitutional amendment without input from the voters.
Florida uses a state commission to consider amending the constitution.
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mediate policy adoption. This analysis follows Lupia et al’s 2010 study of same sex
marriage amendments which utilized this approach and found an increased likelihood of
state adoption of amendments prohibiting same sex marriage when legislative hurdles,
such as the complexity of the requirements for approval, are low. The Lupia et al. study
found that higher hurdles were inversely related to passage of same sex constitutional
amendments. It is feasible to suggest, that in the case of state constitutional amendments
for victims’ rights, these institutional legislative hurdles (whether legislative amendment
procedures are simple or complex), will also factor into the likelihood for adoption.
Objective #7 considers the legislature’s structure in relation to the adoption of crime
victims’ policies. Specifically, Hypothesis #7 predicts:

H7: If a state utilizes a legislatively initiated amendment process, then those
states with less stringent amendment hurdles are more likely to pass a crime victims’
amendment.

II. Methods and Results
To discern the influence of presidential rhetoric on the adoption of state
constitutional amendments, the present study utilizes event history analysis. Sometimes
termed hazard modeling or survival analysis, event history analyses involve pooled crosssectional time series and allow for the examination of dynamic occurrences (Berry and
Berry 1990, 395; Broström 2012, 1). Event history analyses represent a useful analytical
approach to studying the adoption of policies and has been used in the policy diffusion

80

literature, having been pioneered in Berry and Berry (1990)’s seminal event history
analysis of the adoption of lottery programs.
Event history analysis is at times referred to as “hazard modeling” and “survival
analysis” as the approach is concerned with the likelihood that a specific event will occur
among a population studied. The “hazard” at issue involves whether an event may occur
in a particular period, assuming it has not already occurred. Hazard is estimated by
dividing the number of events by the number of cases which are at risk. A related concept
is survival, which involves the idea that a case will “survive” the period without an event
occurrence.
The concept of “failure” involves the idea that a case will experience an event
occurrence. In biomedical studies, such an event may involve the death of a subject. In
policy studies, such an event may entail the adoption of a policy. In the present study, the
hazard represents the adoption of a crime victims’ constitutional amendment by a state
within the study timeframe; states which are said to “survive” are those which do not
adopt an amendment and those states that do adopt an amendment are then considered to
“fail.”
Prior to outlining the specific study details, a few considerations inherent within
event history analysis should be explained. The first consideration involves the concept
of “censoring” data. In an event history analysis, data may be “left censored” or “right
censored.” Left censored data represent cases which have experienced event occurrences
prior to the start of the study period; for example, in the present study, this would entail a
state adopting a constitutional amendment prior to the period of the study. Because the
first state to adopt a victims’ rights constitutional amendment occurred in 1982 and the
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study’s timeframe begins in 1982, left censoring is not a concern of the present study.
Right-censored data is defined as those cases where the event in question does not occur
prior to the end of the study, thus indicating that the time to the event occurrence is
unknown. In the present study, 17 states did not adopt a constitutional amendment within
the study’s timeframe and, thus, is considered right-censored data.

Study Design
The study’s timeframe is selected as 1982 to 2001 which encompasses the
historical wave of initial adoptions of victims’ rights constitutional amendments in the
United States. This period is described herein as “historical” to differentiate it from the
currently ongoing “contemporary” wave of adoptions that have occurred recently (such
as those involving the model policy, Marsy’s Law) and those that are at risk of continuing
to occur. The historical era is the focus of the present study as it represents the initial
development of victims’ rights as a policy issue, whereas the more contemporary wave of
adoptions has occurred against the backdrop where these rights have already been
established. The adoption is described in the study represent initial ones, as some states,
such as California, have since adopted subsequent victims’ rights constitutional
amendments in more recent history.

Coding
In the present study, “events” will be defined as the adoption of a victims’ rights
constitutional amendment. In survival analysis terminology, a state will “fail” when it
adopts a victims’ rights constitutional amendment and will “survive” for the duration it
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does not adopt a victims’ rights constitutional amendment. In a longitudinal data set,
events are coded as 1 in the year in which they occur. The years in which events do not
occur are coded with a dummy variable 0. The dataset in the study provided a snapshot in
time of the context in which those states which adopted amendments did so. For states
that adopted, the “Status” variable was coded 1 and the additional variables reflected
conditions that were present in the year of adoption. States which do not adopt
constitutional amendments within the study’s timeframe were coded 0 and additional
variables reflected conditions that were present in the year the state was “right-censored.”
The main research inquiry of the present study involves the influence of
presidential rhetoric on the adoption of state constitutional amendments. The study
analyzes the effect of presidential rhetoric on policy adoption via a proxy variable which
measures the strength of the use of the word victim indexed with a measure of state
receptivity. For the study, presidential rhetoric was measured through a content analysis
of thousands presidential documents accessed online at the American Presidency Project
(see Chapter 4). The depth and breadth of the use of the term victim was recorded and
results were further indexed with a proxy variable representing presidential approval
through retroactively applied state presidential election results. These values were titled
PresRhet and were coded from 0 to 6 where 0 represented the lowest value of presidential
rhetoric on a state and 6 represented the highest value.
The models also included additional variables to test the hypotheses described
above. Additional variables considered in the study include conditions internal to states,
such as whether the Republican party controlled the state legislature, whether electoral
competition was high in the state legislature, whether a state was considered innovative,
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whether the state was experiencing a peak in crime, and the legislative structure which
affected the ease with which policies are adopted.
To code for Republican control of the state legislature, Ranney Index values from
political scientist Carl Klarner’s dataset was accessed from Harvard University’s
Dataverse. The index, created by political scientist Austin Ranney, is a measure of
electoral competition which considers such indicators as percentage of seats held by each
party in the state legislature, the percentage of the popular vote each party received for
their gubernatorial candidates, and a measure of the time each party held the majority in
the legislature as well as the governorship (Holbrook and La Raja 2013, 87). In the
Ranney Index, states are scored along a continuum where values closest to 0 indicate
Republican control, values closest to 1 indicate Democratic control and values closest to
.5 indicate the condition of electoral competition where party control of the government
is split (Holbrook and LaRaja 2013, 88). Dataset values were obtained (Klarner 2013),
and for the present study, states were recoded 1 for years when under Republican control
and 0 for years when under Democratic control or in periods of electoral competition.
The same Klarner (2013) dataset of Ranney Index values that was used to code
for Republican control was also used to code for electoral competition. For years which
were scored in the Klarner (2013) dataset as competitive, the present study recoded as 1.
All other years, such as those which were indicated as within Democratic control or
which were interpreted to be under Republican control were scored 0.
To assess the effect of crime, crime rate tables were derived from Uniform Crime
Report/FBI Crime Rates for each state for each year throughout the time period of the
study. After assessing both the 20-year period in the study as well as a larger 40-year
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period, a crime peak year was identified for each state. For 40 of the 50 states, the crime
peak occurred within the study’s 20-year timeframe. After identifying the peak crime rate
year, the study established a five-year peak crime range which was defined as the peak
year in addition to the two years previous to and following the peak year. For example,
Alabama’s peak crime year was in 1992 with a rate of 871.7. Therefore, the peak crime
range was defined as 1990 through 1994. The peak crime period range was included
because it was reasoned a state might feel increasing pressure to pass a victims’ rights
amendment during a peak period of exposure to criminal activity. Each of the years in the
peak crime period range was coded 2. A period of two years considered to be within
close proximity to the peak crime period, both before and after the peak crime period,
was also identified. For example, Arizona experienced its peak crime year in 1993 with a
rate of 715. Thus, its peak crime period range was established as 1991 to 1995 and its
close temporal proximity periods as 1989-1990 and 1996-1997. Because Arizona adopted
its amendment in 1989, it received a code of 1. All years outside of the five-year period
peak crime period and two-year close proximity period were coded 0 for each state.
To assess interest group system strength, the 2003 Thomas and Hrebenar study
was used. The Thomas and Hrebenar study developed a typology of interest group system
which ranked state interest group systems according to how powerful groups were
relative to the rest of the political system. These categorizations range from 1) dominant,
2) dominant/complementary; 3) complementary; 4) complementary/subordinate; 5)
subordinate, where dominant represents the greatest magnitude of influence and
subordinate represents the least. The present study coded the data in a range from 3 to 0,
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with states having the strongest interest groups scoring 3 and states with the weakest
interest groups scoring 0.
To assess innovation, the study utilized the rankings from the 2015 Desmarais,
Harden and Boehme study which inferred a “policy diffusion network.” Such a network
involves “persistent patterns” by which policies have been adopted state-to-state
(Desmarais, Harden and Boehmke 2015). The study identified the top 15 states in terms
of innovation defined by how many other states adopt their policies. The rankings were
done in 5-year groupings (such as 80-84). For those time periods occurring within the
present study’s timeframe, states that were ranked as one of the 15 innovators during that
period were coded 1 and those that were not were coded 0.
Assessing the ease with which policies are adopted follows the concept within
Lupia et al 2010 study of same sex marriage, which suggested a relationship between the
method of passing a constitutional amendment and the adoption of a constitutional
amendment. The present study employed the categorizations provided within the Lupia et
al study to discern between ballot measure states and non-ballot measure states. The
study coded 2 for systems allowing citizen initiatives, 1 for simple systems, and 0 for
complex systems, with the reasoning that a system that provided for citizen initiatives
represented the lowest hurdle in policy adoption, a complex system represented the
highest of the three hurdles, and a simple system represented a level of difficulty in
between the two.
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Data Analysis
The program SAS was used to conduct the statistical analyses. Two approaches
evaluated the study data. The non-parametric procedure of plotting survival curves was
used as preliminary data evaluation via Kaplan-Meier estimation, which is also known as
product-life survival estimates. The estimation of survival functions is useful to describe
the course of survival; in the present study, these estimates illustrate graphically the
duration in years that states lasted prior to adopting a crime victims’ constitutional
amendment. The LIFETEST function in SAS is useful to test the null hypothesis that the
values in each survival curve represent different curves.
Following the plotting of survival curves, the popular Cox Regression will be
used. The semi-parametric Cox regression was chosen over a parametric model because
the data did not involve cases of left censorship (states that adopted a victims’ rights
constitutional amendment prior to the study timeframe), in which a parametric model
would be especially effective. Among other useful features, the Cox method also does not
require the researcher to select a probability distribution for the procedure (Allison 2010).
The Cox Regression utilizes a proportional hazards model and a partial likelihood
estimation. Proportional hazards are those in which an individual’s hazard is proportional
to that of other individuals. The partial likelihood estimation retains aspects of maximum
likelihood estimates and offer robustness without having to indicate a baseline hazard
function (Allison 2010). To evaluate the data for the assumption of proportional hazards,
two analyses of residuals were conducted (discussed further in a subsequent section).
In an event history analysis, a “tie” occurs when more than one case has an event
occurrence at the same time. Because of the aggregated time periods represented in
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discrete models (such as months or years), ties are more likely than in continuous models
(Allison 2010). Thus, a mechanism is required to provide an approximation. Although the
Breslow method is a commonly employed method, the Efron method has been touted as
providing a better estimation for tied data (Allison 2010, 142). Because the present study
design involves policy adoptions by year increments, reflecting several ties, the Efron
method was selected for use.
The non-parametric analyses of product-limit survival analyses suggested another
avenue to consider the survival rates of the each of the covariates. Differences among
product-limit survival curves provided insight into the relationship between the coded
aspects of each variable and their respective survival rates in regard to adopting a state
constitutional victims’ rights amendment.

Product-Limit Survival Estimates (Non-Parametric)
To conduct a preliminary evaluation of the data, the Kaplan-Meier estimation was
performed in SAS with the “LIFETEST” command. This procedure provided a
characterization of the survival data. The first column Years denotes how many years
have occurred since the onset of the study. For example, according to the data in the
Figure 5.1 for Year 1, one state “failed” (adopted a constitutional amendment);
consequently, 49 states remain in the column Number Left, representing those cases
which continue to remain at risk of failure. At the half-way point of 10 years in the study,
eight states had adopted a victims’ rights constitutional amendment, with 42 remaining at
risk to adopt. The data also illustrates that 33 of the 50 cases “failed” (adopted a victims’
rights constitutional amendment) within the study’s time period and 17 states were right-
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censored due to non-adoption within the study’s timeframe. See Figure 5.1 for a graphic
representation of survival.

Figure 5.1 Product-Limit Survival Estimate

The Product-Limit survival data indicate that approximately one quarter of the
states that adopted did so within the first half of the study timeframe while three quarters
of the states that adopted did so within the second half of the study timeframe.
In addition to the Product-Limit survival data which characterizes states which
have adopted a constitutional amendment over the study’s timeframe, the study also
evaluated survival curves by covariate. This preliminary data analysis was done in SAS
through the “STRATA” command.
Results of the STRATA analyses reflected variation in the survival curves for
covariates, suggesting varying degrees of influence of the study variables. Log-rank tests
for each covariate help to compare survival distributions between the data values. The
Product-Limit survival estimates of Innovation (Innovation), Crime Peak (CrimePk),
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Legislative Structure (MechEase), Competition (Competition), Interest Group Systems
(Igsystems) and Republican Control (RepControl) will be reviewed in general order of
those variables which suggest the most distinct survival curves. Following these results,
results for the Presidential Rhetoric variable (PresRhet) will be analyzed. Although
Presidential Rhetoric is the main theoretical focus of the study, it is discussed last
because of the complexity of the survival curves.
Innovation. For Innovation, the data are divided between binary values with states
with lower innovation scores=0 and states with high innovation scores=1. See Figure 5.2
for Product-Limit Survival Estimate for Innovation values. Results indicate that, of the 34
states with lower innovation scores, 19 adopted constitutional amendments, whereas, of
the 16 states with higher innovation scores, 14 adopted constitutional amendments.
Results of the log-rank test were significant at p=.0053, thus rejecting the null hypothesis
that the two groups have the same survivor functions.
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Figure 5.2 Product-Limit Survival Estimate for Innovation
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Innovation demonstrated a clear difference in survival functions between the two
values, indicating that those states with a higher innovation score adopted a crime
victims’ rights amendment at a faster rate than states with a lower score. The survival
curves suggest the hypothesized relationship.
Crime Peak. Data for the covariate Crime Peak (Crimepk) are divided into values
0, 1, 2 with 0 representing years where states were neither experiencing a crime peak nor
were in the temporal proximity of a crime peak, 1 representing states within the temporal
proximity of a crime peak; and 2 representing states that were experiencing a crime peak.
Figure 5.3 illustrates the survival curves for Crime Peak values. The graph suggests a
difference between the lowest value of 0 and higher values of 1 and 2 although the curves
for values 1 and 2 demonstrate points of intersection of the values. Results indicate that
five states adopted during a time when they were not experiencing a crime peak; nine
states adopted when they were in close temporal proximity to a crime peak; and 19
adopted when they were experiencing a crime peak. Results of the log-rank test were
significant at p=.0002, thus rejecting the null hypothesis that the groups have the same
survivor functions.
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Figure 5.3 Product-Limit Survival Estimate for Crime Peak

The product-limit survival analyses for states in the temporal proximity of a crime
peak (CrimePk) also demonstrates a difference between its three values with the clearest
distinction between the value of 0 and those of 1 and 2. Those states with the greatest
temporal distance from a crime peak (those with a score of 0) were clearly differentiated
from those that were closer to a crime peak (those with scores of 1 and 2). Differentiation
between the temporal proximity between the values of 1 and 2 was a bit problematic in
that the values exhibited points of intersection. The survival curves demonstrated that, in
earlier years, those with the lower score of 1 adopted sooner than those with the higher
score of 2 which is inconsistent with the hypothesized relationship. At about year 11, the
curves begin to approximate the hypothesized relationship where states that score the
highest score of 2 fail at a rate higher than those with the middle score of 1, and both
scores 2 and 1 fail sooner than those states which scored the lowest value of 0.
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Legislative Structure. For the covariate Legislative Structure, representing the
ease with which legislation may be passed, (MechEase), the data are divided into values
0, 1, 2 where 0 represents complex systems, 1 represents simple systems, and 2 represents
systems which allow citizen initiatives. Figure 5.4 illustrates the survival curves for these
values. Results indicate that states with the complex system (or most difficult method to
adopt an amendment) (n=16), six states adopted, while 10 were right-censored. Of states
with simple systems (n=19), 15 states adopted, while four were right-censored. Of states
with citizen-initiatives (n=15), 12 states adopted, while three were right-censored. Results
of the log-rank test were significant at p=.0128, thus rejecting the null hypothesis that the
groups have the same survivor functions.
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Figure 5.4 Product-Limit Survival Estimate for Legislative Structure

The product-limit survival analyses for states with different legislative structures
(MechEase) demonstrates a difference between its three values with the clearest
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distinction between the value of 0 and those of 1 and 2. Those states with the most
complex systems of passing legislation (those with a score of 0) were differentiated from
those with simpler systems (those with scores of 1 and 2). The survival curves
demonstrated that, in the first half of the study, those states with a score of 2 (reasoned to
be the “least difficult”) failed sooner than states with a score of 1. Additionally, states
with a score of 1 failed sooner than states with a score of 0. These curves suggest
consistency with the hypothesized relationship. Differentiation of the curves in the
second half of the study period was a bit more problematic, as the values of 1 and 2
exhibited points of intersection. The second half of the study furthermore exhibited times
at which states with the value of 1 failed faster than the states with the value of 2. This
relationship is inconsistent with the hypothesis.
Competition. Data for the covariate representing electoral competition in state
legislatures (Competition) are divided between binary values with states with lower
electoral competition in the legislature receiving scores=0 and states whose legislatures
are characterized by electoral competition as receiving scores=1. See Figure 5.5 for
Product-Limit Survival Estimate for Electoral Competition values. Results indicate that,
of the states which scored 0 (n=14), seven adopted and seven were right-censored. Of the
states that were characterized with having an electorally competitive state legislature
(n=35), 25 adopted a victims’ right constitutional amendment while 10 did not. Because
the state of Nebraska has a unicameral legislature, data from the Ranney Index are not
available; the case is excluded from the product-limit survival estimate for this covariate.
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Figure 5.5 Product-Limit Survival Estimate for Electoral Competition

Results of the log-rank test were not significant at p=.1827, thus the null
hypothesis that the groups have the same survivor functions cannot be rejected.
Competition demonstrated differences in the survival functions between the two values 0
and 1 except at a point of intersection occurring in the second half of the study period. In
the first half, the survival curves suggested that more electorally competitive state
governments adopted faster than those that were dominated by a political party; this is
consistent with the hypothesis. In the second half of the study period, points
demonstrated periods where non-competitive governments adopted faster; this is
inconsistent with the hypothesis.
Interest Group Systems. Data for the covariate representing the strength of interest
groups in each state (Igsystem) are divided between four values. States with
progressively stronger interest group systems are scored with a range of values from 0 to
3 with a score of 3 representing the strongest interest group system. See Figure 5.6 for
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Product-Limit Survival Estimate for Interest Group System values. Results indicate that,
of the states which scored 0 (n=3), one adopted while two others were right-censored. Of
those which scored 1 (n=19), ten adopted while 9 did not. Of those which scored 2
(n=21), 16 adopted a constitutional amendment for victims’ rights while five states were
right-censored, and of those which scored 3 (n=6), five states adopted the policy, and one
did not. Because the Thomas-Hrebenar data, from which interest group strength data was
derived, did not include the year 1982, one case (California) was excluded from this
product-limit survival estimate for this covariate. Results of the log-rank test were not
significant at p=.5291, thus the null hypothesis that the groups have the same survivor
functions cannot be rejected.
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Figure 5.6 Product-Limit Survival Estimate for Interest Group System

The product-limit survival estimates of the Interest Group System covariate
suggest limitations with conceptualizing the influence of interest group strength in
relation to policy adoption. The study hypothesized that states with stronger interest
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group systems would be more likely to adopt a constitutional victims’ rights amendment.
However, the results of the survival estimate indicate that states that scored the lowest
were the first to adopt such policies, with each of the other values (scores 1-3) sharing the
survival curve until values 1 and 3 adopt. Among values 1 through 3, states scored with 3
adopted policies sooner than those with 1 and 2, which is consistent with the hypothesis,
yet states scored with 1 generally adopted sooner than those scored as 2, which is
inconsistent with the hypothesis.
Republican Control. Data for the covariate representing Republican party control
of a state legislature (RepControl) are divided between binary values with states with
legislatures characterized by either Democratic control or high electoral competition
receiving scores=0 and states whose legislatures are characterized by Republican control
as receiving scores=1. See Figure 5.7 for Product-Limit Survival Estimate for Republican
Control values. Results indicate that 28 states adopted a victims’ rights amendment when
the state legislature was either Democrat dominated or characterized by
competition. Only four states adopted a victims’ rights amendment when the state
legislature was Republican dominated. Because the state of Nebraska has a unicameral
legislature, no data are available on Republican control; the case is excluded from the
product-limit survival estimate for this covariate. Results of the log-rank test were not
significant at p=.2721, thus the null hypothesis that the groups have the same survivor
functions cannot be rejected.
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Figure 5.7 Product-Limit Survival Estimate for Republican Control

The product-limit survival estimates of the Republican control covariate
(RepControl) produced survival curves that suggested state governments that were not
controlled by the Republican party were quicker to adopt than those which were not,
which is inconsistent with the hypothesized results. Rather than hypothesizing a positive
relationship between Republican control of state constitutional victims’ rights, it is
possible that Republican governments are less amenable to passing particular types of
policies than Democratic or electorally competitive legislatures. Thus, a more nuanced
variable of Republican influence in state policy adoption may benefit a future study.
Presidential Rhetoric. Data for the covariate Presidential Rhetoric (PresRhet)
range between 0 to 6 representing an index of values associated with the incidence of
presidential rhetoric mentioning the word victim and with state election results as a
measure of a state’s receptivity to a president. Higher values represented greater levels of
rhetoric and election support. Results indicate that the single state with the highest score
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of six adopted a victims’ rights constitutional amendment. Of states with scores of 3 or 4
(there were no states with a score of 5), 11 states adopted and three states were rightcensored. Of those states with scores of 0 and 2 (there were no states with a score of 1),
21 adopted while 14 were right-censored. See Figure 5.8 for Product-Limit Survival
Estimate values for Presidential Rhetoric. Results of the log-rank test were significant at
p=<.0001, thus rejecting the null hypothesis that the groups have the same survivor
functions.
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Figure 5.8 Product-Limit Survival Estimate for Presidential Rhetoric

The product-limit survival analysis for the covariate Presidential Rhetoric
(PresRhet) highlights concerns with the use of this covariate. Divided into five separate
values ranging from 0 to 6, with the values of 1 and 5 not represented by any cases, the
graphic representation of the survival curves shows that the single state that was scored
with a 6 did not fail earliest in the study. Rather, a state with the score of 2 (n=14)
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demonstrated the earliest adoption. Also, instead of failing early in the study, states with
a relatively higher score of 4 survived sometime beyond many of the lowest, 0-scoring,
states (n=21).
The product-limit survival estimates of the Presidential Rhetoric variable suggest
important limitations of the coding of the variable derived from the content analysis in
Chapter 4. Observing that states scored 2 survived longer than those scored 0, states that
scored 4 survived longer than those scored 3, and the numerous points of intersection
between the data demonstrate inconsistency with the hypothesized relationship.
Summary. Non-parametric product-limit survival estimates allow for a
preliminary investigation of the survival curves for each of the variables considered. The
results of the STRATA function in SAS provided survival information for the different
codes of each variable. For example, survival curves are demonstrated for each of the
three codes, 0, 1, and 2, of the variable Legislative Structure. Results of the analyses
indicate that the significance levels of four variables: Presidential Rhetoric, Innovation,
Crime Peak and Legislative Structure met the threshold to reject the null hypothesis.
These preliminary results indicate the values of the individual variables each represent
distinct survival curves from the overall adoption survival curve, suggesting their
differentiation. These observations are consistent with expectations. The variables
Competition, Interest Group Systems, and Republican Control did not indicate sufficient
significance levels to reject the null hypothesis. These results are summarized in Table
5.1 Log-Rank Test Significance.
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Table 5.1 Log-Rank Test Significance

Variable
Presidential Rhetoric
Innovation
Crime Peak
Legislative Structure
Competition
Interest Group
Systems
Republican Control

Significance Level
0.0001
0.0053
0.0002
0.0128
0.1827

Reject Null Hypothesis?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

0.5291
0.2721

No
No

Proportional Hazards and Cox Regression
Following the preliminary data evaluation through product-limit survival
analyses, the data were considered for Cox Regression by conducting tests of the
proportional hazard assumption. Two tests were completed, including an evaluation of
both Schoenfeld residuals and martingale residuals. The theoretical basis of the
Schoenfeld approach is that for the values to represent proportional hazards, they must
not be correlated with time (Allison 2010, 176). Schoenfeld residuals were conducted in
SAS and results were evaluated. Because the Pearson coefficients for covariates
approximate the number zero, the analysis was interpreted to reflect that the data have
met the proportional hazards assumption.
An analysis of martingale residuals was also performed in SAS. Analysis of
martingale residuals involves determining if the observed empirical score process,
indicated by a solid line, falls within a number of random simulations, indicated by
dashed lines, that represent proportional hazards (Allison 2010, 173). This test was
conducted using the ASSESS function. Because the lines tended to fall within the lines of
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the simulations, the analysis was interpreted to reflect that the data have met the
proportional hazards assumption.
Because results from the Schoenfeld and martingale residuals indicate that the
proportional hazards assumption in the study data was met, the semi-parametric Cox
Regression was used to model the data.
Stepwise Cox Regression. The Cox Regression was first performed as a stepwise
procedure using PHREG function in SAS. Notably, although presidential rhetoric is the
main theoretical focus of the study, the stepwise regression ultimately eliminated the
covariate PresRhet as an explanatory variable. The chronology of the stepwise process
involved the first model’s selection of the covariate Crimepk for entry with the largest
chi-square (19.9215) and significance p=<.0001 at the SLENTRY=0.25 level. Because
Wald chi-square statistic (p=<.0001) is significant at the SLSTAY=0.15 level, Crimepk
was selected to remain within the model. The remaining variables were then analyzed in
a test adjusted for Crimepk. In the second model, the variable Innovation possessed the
largest chi-square (14.0346) and significance p=.0002 at the SLENTRY=.25 level and,
thus, was entered into the model. Because its Wald chi-square statistic (p=<.0001) is
significant at the at the SLSTAY=0.15 level, Innovation remained in the model. In the
third model, the variable MechEase had the largest chi-square value of the remaining
variables (4.8538) and had significance of p=.0276 at the SLENTRY=.25 level; thus,
MechEase entered the model. Because its Wald chi-square statistic (p=<.0001) is
significant at the SLSTAY=0.15 level, MechEase remained in the model. In the fourth

model, the variable Competition had the largest chi-square value of remaining variables
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(1.4009) and significance p=.2366. Because its Wald chi-square statistic was not
significant (p=.2409) at the SLSTAY=.15 level, it was removed from the model.
At this step, because the Competition variable was removed in the previous
model, yet possesses the largest chi-square value of remaining variables, the model
building terminates and covariates Igsystem, RepControl and PresRhet are excluded from
further consideration. Thus, the stepwise regression concludes with selection of
explanatory variables of Crimepk, Innovation, and MechEase. As indicated, the variable
of particular interest to the present study, PresRhet, was excluded as an explanatory
variable by the stepwise regression procedure.
Cox Regression. Following the stepwise procedure, a Cox Regression was also
performed without the stepwise function. Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
indicate the hazard ratios for each of the variables. A hazard ratio is the ratio between
cases exposed to the risk covariate and those not exposed. Hazard ratios over the value of
1 represent a relationship between the variable and policy adoption. Ratios under the
value of 1 represent an inverse relationship between the variable and policy adoption.
Hazard ratios approximating the value of 1 suggest no effect. Results are shown in Figure
5.9.
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As indicated in Figure 5.9, the hazard ratio of PresRhet, the main theoretical focus

of the study, closely approximates the value of 1 (.964), thus suggesting no effect on the
adoption of state victims’ rights constitutional amendments. Innovation scored the
highest hazard ratio, with a score of 3.809. This value reflects the idea that highly
innovative states were almost four times as likely to adopt a state-level victims’ rights
constitutional amendment. States that were in the temporal proximity of a peak in crime
rates also appeared to be associated with adoption of a victims’ rights constitutional
amendment. With a hazard ratio of 3.106, these states were approximately three times as
likely as other states to adopt such a policy. As Figure 5.9 indicates, the structure of a
state’s legislature was also related to the adoption of a state level crime victims’ rights
constitutional amendment. The variable MechEase had a hazard ratio of 1.869, indicating
that a state with less formidable hurdles to passing legislation had almost twice the
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likelihood to adopt a state-level victims’ rights constitutional amendment. The variable
Competition had a hazard ratio of 1.390 which suggests that states with higher electoral
competition in their legislatures have a somewhat greater likelihood than those who do
not of adopting a victims’ rights constitutional amendment. Like PresRhet, Igsystem
closely approximated the value of 1 (with a hazard ratio of .948), suggesting it also did
not have an effect on the adoption of a victims’ rights constitutional amendment. Lastly,
states that were controlled by the Republican party appeared to have a slightly lesser
likelihood of adopting state victims’ rights amendments, as the variable RepControl had a
hazard ratio of .709.

III. Conclusion
Results of both the stepwise Cox Regression and Cox Regression suggest that the
main focus of study, Presidential Rhetoric did not represent an explanatory variable in the
adoption of a state victims’ rights constitutional amendment. Rather, it was excluded
from the final model in the stepwise regression and its hazard ratio in the Cox Regression
closely indicated no effect with a hazard ratio approximating the value of 1. One other
covariate, Igsystems, demonstrated no effect, having been both eliminated from the
stepwise regression and having a hazard ratio of 1 from the Cox Regression. While the
covariate Competition was eliminated from the stepwise regression, its hazard ratio was
just above the value of 1, suggesting little effect, if any. The covariate RepControl was
also excluded from the final model of the stepwise regression however, converse to the
covariate Competition, its hazard ratio was less than 1, suggesting little inverse effect, if
any. Three covariates demonstrated a positive relationship to the adoption of state
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constitutional victims’ rights amendments by being included in the final model of the
stepwise regression and having hazard ratios from the Cox Regression notably higher
than the value of 1. These variables included Innovation, Crime Peak and Legislature
Structure.
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Chapter 6 Discussion
I. Introduction
Although the results of the event history analysis in Chapter 5 found a positive
association between three of the covariates considered in the study and the dependent
variable of adoption of a state crime victims’ constitutional amendment, the study’s main
theoretical focus, the influence of presidential rhetoric on policy adoption, was not
supported by the analysis. In this chapter, I will discuss the findings from the event
history analysis as well as the content analysis from Chapter 4 which constructed the
Presidential Rhetoric variable. Following this discussion, a case study is presented to
highlight apparent influential factors in the adoption of its victims’ rights constitutional
amendment. Results from the event history analysis suggest the utility of examining the
experience of the State of California for further qualitative analysis.

II. Discussion
The present study sought to examine the relationship between federal influence, in
the form of presidential rhetoric regarding domestic crime victims, and the adoption of
state victims’ rights constitutional amendments. The results of an event history analysis
fail to indicate a positive relationship between increased presidential rhetoric regarding
crime victims and the adoption of these victims’ rights constitutional amendments within
the states. Examination of other covariates, such as Republican control of state
government, the strength of interest groups within a state, and electoral competition in
state government, also failed to demonstrate a positive relationship with the adoption of
such policies. Covariates such as Innovation (Innovation), Crime Peak (CrimePk) and
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Legislative Structure (MechEase), however, suggested a positive relationship. The
positive association between these covariates and the dependent variable are not
surprising as they support the explanatory efficacy of these factors addressed in other
research efforts. The associations make intuitive sense, as well, as states facing high
crime rates, for example, may experience more demand for relief in the form of victims’
rights. Both the stepwise Cox Regression model and hazard ratios from the Cox
Regression produced similar results in identifying the variables associated with
influencing the adoption of a policy and those that were not.
It is reasonable to expect that when the president puts an issue on the political
agenda, states will respond with policy adoption, especially those states which are more
inclined to be receptive to presidential rhetoric. The question remains as to why this
association was not reflected in the study’s findings. An effort to answer this question
could entail a reevaluation of the construction of the Presidential Rhetoric variable in the
Chapter 4 content analysis. Specifically, the variable could be reconsidered for how
precisely it measures the concept of federal influence by presidential rhetoric in the
states. As highlighted in Chapter 4, the values for presidential support are derived from
retroactively applied election results. These may not be the most accurate representation
of how receptive states and their residents are to presidential rhetoric. The retroactive
quality of the election results are arguably less precise measurements because rhetorical
communication and presidential actions are made throughout the president’s term while
presidential elections only occur every four years. Therefore, a president’s popularity as
indicated by election results may not reflect the variation in popularity that may have
occurred previously within the president’s term. Including a yearly average of
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presidential approval rates in addition to state election results in the indexed values may
produce a more accurate measurement. However, measurement accuracy continues to be
an issue as each of the components to the indexed values are measured in different time
periods: presidential approval has generally been measured every few days, presidential
rhetoric is recorded on a daily basis, presidential elections as a representation of popular
support is measured every four years, and policy adoption as represented in the present
study has been measured in discrete increments of a year.
Although the president represents the most powerful political actor in the United
States, it is possible that presidential rhetoric is simply insufficient to influence state
adoption of constitutional amendments. It may be such that citizens are largely unaware
of presidential rhetoric or less influenced by presidential rhetoric than by other more
“local” factors, such as those characterizing the individual states, such as crime rate and
legislative structure. Presidential rhetoric may be influential in ways that are not
examined in the present study, such as in the adoption of state statutes. Conversely, it is
possible that presidential rhetoric functions as less of an influence on the states and more
of a response or acknowledgment to what is occurring in the states. This consideration
would implicate a “bottom-up” diffusion, rather than the “top-down” orientation
considered in the present study.
Results of the present event history analysis have suggested a relationship
between the adoption of crime victims’ state constitutional amendments and three of the
covariates included in the study, while the influence of others, including that of
presidential rhetoric, was not supported. Important questions remain regarding the factors
that influence the adoption of such policies as well as the potential for the dynamic
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interaction between these variables. Finally, as the evolution of crime victim policy
continues, the influence of one covariate may ebb while another develops. A better
understanding of how these factors fit together is needed. To this end, a case study is
useful in providing a more holistic exploration of factors present in the adoption of crime
victims’ state constitutional amendments. A case study, furthermore, provides insight into
some of the limitations of the present study.

III. Case Study: California
The state of California emerges as a natural selection for case study analysis in the
adoption of state constitutional crime victims’ amendments. California was the first state
to adopt a constitutional victims’ rights amendment in both the historical era as well as
the more contemporary era. California led the other states by a minimum of six years in
both the adoption of a victims’ rights amendment in the historical wave (1982) as well as
the more contemporary period of Marsy’s Law (2008), demonstrating its innovative
nature – a factor which was supported by the present analysis as related to the adoption of
a victims’ rights constitutional amendment. California is a compelling candidate for case
study for other factors not supported in the quantitative study, as well. Most central to the
main theoretical argument, however, is the fact that California was the first state to adopt
a constitutional victims’ rights amendment in 1982 while Ronald Reagan was president.
As discussed more fully in Chapter 3, Ronald Reagan championed for victims’ rights
through high-profile pronouncements and actions. Because Reagan had previously served
two terms as the governor of California and was a Hollywood actor before that, he may
have enjoyed heightened popularity among Californians, accentuating his potential
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influence in the adoption of policy he supported. As the California case study unfolds,
however, insights that are somewhat at odds with the results of the present quantitative
study are revealed and further underscore the importance of reevaluating measurement of
key concepts as well as methodological approach.
An examination of social and political contextual factors of the study illustrates
the backdrop of the adoption of the California policies, highlighting potential influences
that led to the adoption of the policy and suggesting avenues for future analysis. These
influences underscore two critical observations – 1) that the apparent influences involved
in the passage of the 1982 amendment are not reflected in the results of the event history
analysis, and 2) that the apparent influences involved in the passage of the 2008
amendment appear to vary from those present in 1982. The results of this case analysis
highlight the complex nature of influential factors associated with the adoption of crime
victims’ rights constitutional amendments in the states.

1982 Crime and Ideological Backdrop
California passed its first victims’ rights constitutional amendment in the June 8,
1982, election as a combined constitutional amendment and state statute. The first of any
of the state victims’ constitutional rights, California’s Proposition 8 was approved with
56.4 percent of the vote.
California’s state government ideological backdrop at the time of passage of the
first amendment, reflected a mixture of Democrat and Republican influences. While the
governor at the time of the policy’s passage was Democrat Jerry Brown, Brown was
succeeded in 1983 by Republican George Deukmejian. On the national stage, the current
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president was Ronald Reagan, previous governor of California from 1967 to 1975, who
had won the State of California in the 1980 election. Reagan garnered 52.69 percent of
California’s popular vote in the contest against incumbent president Jimmy Carter.
Republican Pete Wilson, mayor of San Diego, won a seat in the U.S. Senate in 1982 left
available by outgoing Republican Samuel Hayakawa, joining Democrat Senator Alan
Cranston in his third Senate term. In 1982, Democrats dominated both the California
State Assembly and the California State Senate. Likewise, California’s delegation of U.S.
Representatives was dominated by Democrats.
As was the case with many other states, the violent crime rate in California had
been rising in the decade between 1972 and 1982, the year of California’s adoption. For
California, the rates reported by the FBI National Incident-Based Reporting System
(NIBRS) were 540.7 per 100,000 people in 1972, 669.3 in 1976, and 893.6 in 1980. In
1981, the year prior to adoption, the rate dropped to 863, then 814.7 in 1982, and
continued to maintain a modest downward trend or decreased rate in the subsequent three
years. By 1986, however, the rate had exceeded previous levels when it climbed to 920.5
per 100,000. From there, the violent crime rate started to trend upwards and would
continue to do so until it reached its maximum crime rate of the period between 1972 and
2011, that of 1119.7 per 100,000 people. While California did not adopt its initial crime
victims’ constitutional amendment during a period of its peak crime rate, it did adopt
following a period of violent crime trending upward (See Figure 6.1 for California
Violent Crime Rate 1972-2010).
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Figure 6.1 California Violent Crime Rate 1972-2010

2008 Crime and Ideological Background
Twenty-six years later, in 2008 when California replaced its original policy with
another constitutional amendment, Proposition 9 passed as a combined constitutional
amendment and state statute also. It passed with 53.9 percent of the popular vote.
At the time of California’s second iteration of crime victims’ constitutional rights
in 2008, the state was already governed by Republican Arnold Schwarzenegger who had
taken office in 2003. However, other significant elected positions were largely dominated
by Democrats. In the national election, California gave strong support (approximately 61
percent) to the Obama/Biden Democrat presidential candidacy. Both U.S. Senate and
House of Representatives delegations, as well as delegations to the State Assembly and
State Senate, were dominated by Democrats in this era.
The crime rate in this era was also markedly different than that during the passage
of the first victims’ rights constitutional amendment. Rather than following an upward
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trend, as was the situation in 1982, the violent crime rate in 2008 was 504.2 per 100,000,
the lowest rate California had seen in over three decades and was generally experiencing
a downward trend.

Groups in 1982 and 2008
Group influence may also have varied between the eras of policy adoption in
California. An historical analysis of the passage of each amendment illustrates the
differing influences.
The 1982 California voter guide included arguments in favor by the lieutenant
governor, the attorney general, and by political activist Paul Gann. Gann’s statement
refers to recent previous initiative efforts that he led; those included an initiative to
reduce property taxes and to limit government spending; Furthermore, he emphasizes the
“crime control” aspects of the proposition (Voter Information Guide for 1982, Primary).
A populist inclination may be indicated by his comments, “Why is that the Legislature
doesn’t start getting serious about a problem until we, the people, go out and qualify an
initiative?” and, “Again, it is up to the people to bring about reasonable and meaningful
reform.” The LA Times, also writing about Gann’s death, quoted Republican
Assemblyman Ross Johnson describing Gann as “the will of the common man, ignored
by politicians, that rose up to challenge and defeat the inaction of the Legislature"
(Folkart 1989). Other sources indicated that Gann had formed the Gann Taxpayer
Organization as well as a conservative group entitled “People’s Advocate” in 1974; he
was a Republican challenger to a U.S. Senate seat in 1980 and was involved in a “series”
of initiative campaigns (McQuiston 1989, Paul Gann Archive).

114

An oral history account of Gann’s activities which was produced through a series
of interviews conducted in 1987 and 1988 by the California State Government Oral
History Program demonstrates Gann’s role in the Victims’ Rights Amendment. In it,
Gann credits his motivation in pursuing the passage of the proposition to his growing
frustration over rape victims’ plights and victims’ treatment within the court system (74).
Furthermore, Gann described the role of groups in the proposition efforts. When
asked whether women’s movement organizations had supported him on the Victims’
Rights proposition, Gann indicated that he had worked with women, but not as
representing women organizations, and suggested, rather, that the rise of organizational
support came after Proposition 8.
Whereas the role of Paul Gann in the passage of the 1982 amendment might be
characterized as a policy entrepreneur due to his experience in organizing ballot
initiatives as well as because Gann does not seem to personally align himself with the
plight of victims, research suggests that the groups supporting the second iteration of
California’s victims’ rights amendment represent issue stakeholders. This difference is
clear with a comparative analysis of the proponents in the voters’ guide for the 1982 and
2008 amendments. In 2008, arguments either made in favor of Proposition 9 or as a
rebuttal to an argument against Proposition 9 were made by stakeholder individuals or
those affiliated with groups. The sole individual proponent listed in the voter guide
included the creator of “Jessica’s Law: Sexual Predator Punishment and Control Act of
2006.” Groups represented in the voter guide included Justice for Homicide Victims,
Justice for Murdered Children, the National Organization of Parents of Murdered
Children, and Crime Victims United of California.
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Justice for Homicide Victims was founded by Ellen Griffin Dunne following the
1983 murder of Dominique Dunne in Los Angeles. Co-founder, Marcella Leach, mother
of murder victim Marsy Nicholas, was described at her recent death as “the face
behind…the Crime Victims' Bill of Rights Act of 2008.” Leach’s daughter, Marsy,
became the namesake to the Act, which is also referred to as “Marsy’s Law.” Marsy’s
Law has gone on to become model legislation, first passed in California’s 2008 election,
and then subsequently passed in other states, including Illinois in 2014 and most recently
in North Dakota, South Dakota, and Montana in 2016. Efforts to pass Marsy’s Law
continue to be active in a number of other states.
Behind Marsy’s Law efforts is Dr. Henry Nicholas, whose biographical
information on the organization website indicates he is “co-founder, and former cochairman of the board, president and chief executive officer of Broadcom Corporation, a
Fortune 500 company. He is also a philanthropist and leader of the victim’s rights
movement” (Marsy’s Law). Nicholas’ role in the amendment’s passage is clarified in the
same biographical excerpt which indicates Nicholas founded the campaign for Marsy’s
Law in California and then formed the national effort in 2009 to improve victims’ rights
(Marsy’s Law). A billionaire, Nicholas is credited for funding the Marsy’s Law efforts. A
2008 Vanity Fair article listed Nicholas’ net worth, as determined by Forbes, at $1.8
billion (McClean 2008). Currently, Forbes estimates Nicholas’ “real time net worth” at
$3.1 billion, ranking him 654th in the world (Forbes). A 2008 Los Angeles Times article
reported that Nicholas had provided $4.8 million of the campaign’s $5 million in funds
(Rothfeld). More recently, a South Dakota newspaper article indicated that Nicholas had
funded $800,000 to the South Dakota Marsy’s Law effort at the time of the story’s
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publishing and was also currently bankrolling efforts in states such as North Dakota,
North Carolina, Hawaii, Kentucky, Montana, and Nevada (Ferguson 2016).
Justice for Murdered Children was also represented in the effort to pass
California’s 2008 amendment. Justice for Murdered Children was formed in 1996 by
LaWanda Hawkins, a mother of a murder victim, with the mission of reducing unsolved
homicides and helping homicide victims’ families (Justice for Murdered Children). The
National Organization for Parents of Murdered Children also participated in advocating
for the 2008 amendment. Parents of Murdered Children was formed in 1978 in
Cincinnati, Ohio, by parents of a 19-year-old murder victim, the national organization
first began to meet in a single basement room of the Archdiocese in Cincinnati in 1980.
Crime Victims United of California was founded in 1990 by Harriet Salarno, whose 18year-old daughter was murdered in 1979.
Rebuttals to arguments in favor or arguments against were also presented by
individuals and groups. Individuals included the former warden of San Quentin State
Prison and the former director of the California Department of Corrections. Groups
included California Church IMPACT and the Justice Policy Institute. California Church
IMPACT is a faith-based public policy advocacy group that emphasizes “justice, equity,
and fairness in the treatment of all people, particularly those who have been abandoned or
harmed by our society” (California Church IMPACT). Justice Policy Institute is a
national nonprofit “dedicated to reducing the use of incarceration and the justice system
by promoting fair and effective policies” (Justice Policy Institute).
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IV. Case Study Conclusion
The California case study provides important insight into factors involved in the
adoption of its state constitutional victims’ rights amendment. In so doing, it helps to
illustrate shortcomings of the present quantitative analysis. While the quantitative
analysis assists in the identification of explanatory aspects of the adoption of the first of
California’s constitutional amendments, the present qualitative analysis highlights the
complexity of the factors surrounding the adoption of victims’ rights constitutional
amendments in California.
The case study illustrated variation in the factors present at the time of the
adoption of the historical amendment and the more contemporary one. These variations
support the contention that the historical crime victims’ movement can be studied
separately from the contemporary one, as different forces may be at play in each era. For
example, as this case study has illustrated, while the crime rate was generally on the rise
in California at the time of the first adoption, it was at a relatively low rate for California
at the time of the second adoption. In both eras of adoption, there were Republicans in
significant elected political roles, but the more contemporary era was characterized by
comparatively greater support for Democrat candidates. Groups also appear to vary
between these eras, where the historical era seems to have been largely influenced by
conservative activist Paul Gann’s policy entrepreneurship while issue groups came to the
forefront in the 2008 effort. Groups that appear to have been prominent in the 2008
proposition were not yet even formed at the time of the 1982 proposition. These include
Justice for Homicide Victims which was not formed until 1983, and Justice for Murdered
Children which was not formed until 1996.
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The California case study complements the findings of the event history analysis,
providing further insight into factors associated with the adoption of state constitutional
victims’ rights amendments. Results from each study provide important information and
research avenues for future study of state constitutional change.

Future Avenues
Although the influence of Presidential Rhetoric was not supported in the present
quantitative study, refining the measurement of the concept may improve its validity.
Rather than utilizing a more comprehensive assessment of presidential documents, a
future study might take a more circumscribed approach to which documents are most
relevant. For example, some presidential documents may have greater ability to reach
those responsible for policymaking. An alternative measurement of state receptivity to
presidential rhetoric might also contribute to refinement of the PresRhet variable.
Although the concept of Presidential Rhetoric was operationalized to represent
federal influence in the present study, it is also possible that efforts of Congress or of the
Supreme Court would influence the adoption of state constitutional victims’ rights
amendments in the states. As outlined in Chapter 3, each of the branches took notable
actions furthering the development of victims’ rights. Thus, future studies may benefit
from a consideration of these avenues of inquiry.
The variations demonstrated in crime rate, group participation and, to some
extent, ideological influence in the California case study across the two adoptions of
constitutional rights further suggest important avenues for future studies. Although
California reflected a rising crime rate at the passage of its first constitutional
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amendment, its second one occurred at a time with a relatively low crime rate. While the
results of the event history analysis support the idea that crime rates were influential to
the adoption of victims’ rights constitutional amendments in the study period, the
California experience in 2008 does not appear to be consistent with such a hypothesis.
Longitudinal analyses could offer insight into future study of the adoption of these
policies by considering the extent to which a former era may set the stage for establishing
the legitimacy of a policy for victims’ rights and subsequent policy adoptions rely on the
premise that victims’ rights are accepted – a premise that was established in an era which
relied on a high crime rate to bring the issue to the attention of individuals and political
actors.
Although group influence was neither significant in the results of the event history
analysis nor did it suggest a positive relationship between group strength in the individual
states and the adoption of a crime victims’ constitutional amendment, further examination
of the potential influence of groups might better be understood with a qualitative analysis
that constructs a measurement of victims’ group strength. Group influence might also
best be examined with a longitudinal dimension as well, as California suggests a rise in
group organization and participation over time.

V. Conclusion
While the event history analysis did not find evidence of the influence of
presidential rhetoric on the adoption of state constitutional victims’ rights amendments in
the study period, this finding is an important one. The influence of presidential rhetoric
does not appear to extend into state constitutional amendment adoption. These findings

120

are important for scholars of presidential power as well as federalism and state
government. Furthermore, the study findings which associate crime rates, legislative
structure, and state innovation with amendment adoption are important to scholars and
policy practitioners.
At the same time, there are important limitations of the study to consider. Many of
the variables could offer more precise measurement of the concepts. Presidential rhetoric,
the primary focus of the study, relied on independently gathered data from a content
analysis of presidential documents. It is possible that documents selected for analysis
could be further refined to include only ones with the highest likelihood of reaching the
public, such as the State of the Union address, which is commonly televised to the public.
The content analysis coded for manifest content only, rather than latent, underlying
messages, which could have also produced important references to consider. While
coding for manifest content maximized the coding reliability for references to victim,
excluding latent content may be missing effective influences on the president’s
audiences.
The variable for Interest Group Systems would be improved with a more focused
measurement on the strength of victims’ rights groups, rather than on the strength of
interest group systems in each state. The results of the qualitative analysis suggest that
victim groups may have been developing during the early years of the historic victims’
rights movement. Thus, a state could have a strong interest group system with weak
representation from victim interest groups. Additionally, a state may also have groups
that oppose victims’ rights which may mitigate the influence a victims’ rights group may
have.
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Although the variable for Crime Peak produced positive results in the study, using
other measures may have demonstrated a more defined relationship between crime and
the adoption of victims’ rights amendments. For example, public perception of crime may
be a more accurate measure; it is possible a state’s crime rate may be largely unknown to
its citizens, and thus result in less demand for relief in the form of victims’ rights,
whereas perception of crime would more directly consider the awareness of the citizenry
to victimization. A related concept could include the media reporting of violent crime,
where increased attention to the most shocking of crimes, may produce fear in the public
that is not necessarily related to the actual incidence of crime. The occurrence of a
notorious crime in a particular state and the media attention that follows may also raise
the level of cognizance of the public to criminal victimization that is not reflected in
crime rates. It is useful to also mention that using Uniform Crime Reports violent crime
rates contains some degree of imprecision, as some crimes may have occurred, yet failed
to have been reported.
There were other potential factors that could also be included in the study that
were not, due to the lack of readily available state-level data. For example, state-level
public approval of the president would likely have improved the sensitivity of the “state
receptivity” component of the presidential rhetoric variable. It would have offered a more
precise year-by-year evaluation of approval ratings, rather than an evaluation of the
president’s performance in four-year increments, retroactively applied, because a
president may be more or less popular at specific times and as particular events occur
during their term in office.
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The present study also highlights challenges associated with a comprehensive
analysis of state constitutional change across all 50 states. To conduct the analysis, the
study utilized a significant amount of aggregated data in discrete format that entails
losing a bit of precision. A study of unique states and their citizens, however, may benefit
from a more focused examination. Qualitative studies that are focused on the individual
social and political contexts in which these policies appear may reveal important nuances
regarding the adoption of victims’ rights. For example, evaluating the effect of
presidential rhetoric on the adoption of policy may benefit from an individual
consideration of the timeline of events that led to the adoption of the amendment in each
of the states. This is because the process of adoption in one state may lead to a longer
period of time before adoption is finalized. Thus, it is possible that two different states
could be influenced by the same factor (such as presidential rhetoric) to adopt, but the
time to adoption vary. Furthermore, the outcome of the influence may vary, as states may
opt to adopt other victim-related policies. Although this study was concerned with the
influence of presidential rhetoric on the adoption of state constitutional rights, a future
study could consider whether any states adopted strong statutes in addition to, or in lieu
of, constitutional rights.
The study’s emphasis on the influence of the presidential rhetoric helps inform an
understanding of federal influence on state constitutional change. Many avenues for
future research remain. Federal influence can be operationalized by actions of each of the
tripartite branches, such as, for example, Congressional legislation, Supreme Court
jurisprudence, and actions taken by the executive administration. Each of these implicates
federalism in the United States and the autonomy of state government.
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Although the study did not find evidence of a relationship between presidential
rhetoric and the adoption of state constitutional victims’ rights, results of the event
history analysis indicate a relationship between factors such as innovation, crime rate,
and legislative structure. These findings underscore the explanatory ability of these
variables from previous research efforts as well as make intuitive sense. It is a reasonable
expectation that states which are characterized as “leaders” in the adoption of policies
would tend to lead the way in the adoption of state constitutional victims’ rights and that
those which have an easier method of changing their constitution would experience
amendment adoption more than those with more difficult methods. Lastly, it is not
surprising that states which experience a period of higher crime levels are more likely to
adopt victims’ rights constitutional amendments.
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Appendix A
Excerpt from the 1988 Democrat Party Platform
WE BELIEVE that the federal government should provide increased assistance to local
criminal justice agencies, enforce a ban on "cop killer" bullets that have no purpose other
than the killing and maiming of law enforcement officers, reinforce our commitment to help
crime victims, and assume a leadership role in securing the safety of our neighborhoods and
homes. We further believe that the repeated toleration in Washington of unethical and
unlawful greed among too many of those who have been governing our nation, procuring our
weapons and polluting our environment has made far more difficult the daily work of the
local policemen, teachers and parents who must convey to our children respect for justice and
authority.

1988 Democratic Party Platform. The American Presidency Project.
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/1988-democratic-party-platform
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Excerpt from the 1988 Republican Party Platform
Crime
Republicans want a free and open society for every American. That means more than
economic advancement alone. It requires the safety and security of persons and their
property. It demands an end to crime.
Republicans stand with the men and women who put their lives on the line every day, in State
and local police forces and in federal law enforcement agencies. We are determined to
reestablish safety in the streets of those Communities where the poor, the hard-working, and
the elderly now live in fear. Despite opposition from liberal
Democrats, we've made a start:
• The rate of violent crime has fallen 20 percent since 1981. Personal thefts fell 21 percent,
robberies fell 31 percent, assaults fell 17 percent, and household burglaries fell 30 percent.
• In 1986, crimes against individuals reached their lowest level in 14 years.
• The Reagan-Bush Administration has crusaded for victims' rights in trials and sentencing
procedures and has advocated restitution by felons to their victims.
• We have been tough on white-collar crime, too. We have filed more criminal anti-trust
cases than the previous Administration.
• We pushed a historic reform of toughened sentencing procedures for federal courts to
make the punishment fit the crime.
• We appointed to the courts judges who have been sensitive to the rights of victims and
law abiding citizens.
We will forge ahead with the Republican anti-crime agenda:
• We must never allow the presidency and the Department of Justice to fall into the hands
of those who coddle hardened criminals. Republicans oppose furloughs for those criminals
convicted of first degree murder and others who are serving a life sentence without
possibility of parole. We believe that victims' rights should not be accorded less importance
than those of convicted felons.
• We will reestablish the federal death penalty.
• We will reform the exclusionary rule, to prevent the release of guilty felons on
technicalities.
• We will reform cumbersome habeas corpus procedures, used to delay cases and prevent
punishment of the guilty.
• We support State laws implementing preventive detention to allow courts to deny bail to
those considered dangerous and likely to commit additional crimes.
The election of 1988 will determine which way our country deals with crime. A Republican
President and a Republican Congress can lay the foundation for a safer future.

1988 Republican Party Platform. The American Presidency Project
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/republican-party-platform-1988
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Excerpt from the 1992 Democrat Party Platform
Combatting Crime and Drugs
Crime is a relentless danger to our communities. Over the last decade, crime has swept
through our country at an alarming rate. During the 1980s, more than 200,000 Americans
were murdered, four times the number who died in Vietnam. Violent crimes rose by more
than 16 percent since 1988 and nearly doubled since 1975. In our country today, a murder is
committed every 25 minutes, a rape every six minutes, a burglary every 10 seconds. The
pervasive fear of crime disfigures our public life and diminishes our freedom.
None suffer more than the poor: an explosive mixture of blighted prospects, drugs and exotic
weaponry has turned many of our inner city communities into combat zones. As a result,
crime is not only a symptom but also a major cause of the worsening poverty and
demoralization that afflicts inner city communities.
To empower America's communities, Democrats pledge to restore government as the
upholder of basic law and order for crime-ravaged communities. The simplest and most
direct way to restore order in our cities is to put more police on the streets.
America's police are locked in an unequal struggle with crime: since 1951 the ratio of police
officers to reported crimes has reversed, from three-to-one to one-to-three. We will create a
Police Corps, in which participants would receive college aid in return for several years of
service after graduation in a state or local police department. As we shift people and
resources from defense to the civilian economy, we will create new jobs in law enforcement
for those leaving the military.
We will expand drug counselling and treatment for those who need it, intensify efforts to
educate our children at the earliest ages to the dangers of drug and alcohol abuse, and curb
demand from the street corner to the penthouse suite, so that the U.S., with five percent of the
world's population, no longer consumes 50 percent of the world's illegal drugs.
Community Policing.
Neighborhoods and police should be partners in the war on crime. Democrats support more
community policing, which uses foot patrols and storefront offices to make police officers
visible fixtures in urban neighborhoods. We will combat street violence and emphasize
building trust and solving the problems that breed crime.
Firearms.
It is time to shut down the weapons bazaars in our cities. We support a reasonable waiting
period to permit background checks for purchases of handguns, as well as assault weapons
controls to ban the possession, sale, importation and manufacture of the most deadly assault
weapons. We do not support efforts to restrict weapons used for legitimate hunting and
sporting purposes. We will work for swift and certain punishment of all people who violate
the country's gun laws and for stronger sentences for criminals who use guns. We will also
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Excerpt from the 1992 Democrat Party Platform (cont.)
seek to shut down the black market for guns and impose severe penalties on people who sell
guns to children.
Pursuing All Crime Aggressively.
In contrast to the Republican policy of leniency toward white collar crime—which breeds
cynicism in poor communities about the impartiality of our justice system—Democrats will
redouble efforts to ferret out and punish those who betray the public trust, rig financial
markets, misuse their depositors' money or swindle their customers.
Further Initiatives.
Democrats also favor innovative sentencing and punishment options, including community
service and boot camps for first time offenders; tougher penalties for rapists; victim-impact
statements and restitution to ensure that crime victims will not be lost in the complexities of
the criminal justice system; and initiatives to make our schools safe, including alternative
schools for disruptive children.

1992 Democrat Party Platform. The American Presidency Project.
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/1992-democratic-party-platform
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Excerpt from the 1992 Republican Party Platform
Safe Homes and Streets. One of the first duties of government is to protect the public
security—to maintain law and order so that citizens are free to pursue the fruits of life and
liberty. The Democrats have forsaken this solemn pledge. Instead of protecting society from
hardened criminals, they blame society and refuse to hold accountable for their actions
individuals who have chosen to engage in violent and criminal conduct. This has led to the
state of affairs in which we find ourselves today.
Violent crime is the gravest domestic threat to our way of life. It has turned our communities
into battlegrounds, playgrounds into grave yards. It threatens everyone, but especially the
very young, the elderly, the weak. It destroys business and suffocates economic opportunity
in struggling communities. It is a travesty that some American children have to sleep in
bathtubs for protection from stray bullets. The poverty of values that justifies drive-by
shootings and random violence holds us hostage and insecure, even in our own homes. We
must work to develop community-help projects designed to instill a sense of responsibility
and pride.
This is the legacy of a liberalism that elevates criminals' fights above victims' rights, that
justifies soft-on-crime judges' approving early-release prison programs, and that leaves law
enforcement officers powerless to deter crime with the threat of certain punishment.
For twelve years, two Republican Presidents have fought to reverse this trend, along with
Republican officials in the States. They have named tough law-and-order judges, pushed for
minimum mandatory sentences, expanded federal assistance to States and localities, sought to
help States redress court orders on prison overcrowding, and devoted record resources that
are turning the tide against drugs. They have repeatedly proposed legislation, consistently
rejected by congressional Democrats, to restore the severest penalties for the most heinous
crimes, to ensure swift and certain punishment, and to end the legal loopholes that let
criminals go free.
Congressional Democrats reject Republican reform of the exclusionary rule that prohibits use
of relevant evidence obtained in good faith and allows criminals, even murderers, to go free
on a technicality. They reject our reform of habeas corpus law to prevent the appellate
process from becoming a lawyers' game to thwart justice through endless appeals and
procedural delays. They refuse to enact effective procedures to reinstate the death penalty for
the most heinous crimes. They reject tougher, mandatory sentences for career criminals.
Instead, Congressional Democrats actually voted to create more loopholes for vicious thugs
and fewer protections for victims of crime and have opposed mandatory restitution for
victims. Their crime legislation, which we emphatically reject, cripples law enforcement by
overturning over twenty United States Supreme Court cases that have helped to reduce crime
and keep violent criminal offenders off the streets.
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Excerpt from the 1992 Republican Party Platform (cont.)
For too long our criminal justice system has carefully protected the rights of criminals and
neglected the suffering of the innocent victims of crime and their families. We support the
rights of crime victims to be present, heard, and informed throughout the criminal justice
process and to be provided with restitution and services to aid their recovery.
We believe in giving police the resources to do their job. Law enforcement must remain
primarily a State and local responsibility. With 95 percent of all violent crimes within the
jurisdiction of the States, we have led efforts to increase the number of police protecting our
citizens. We also support incentives to encourage personnel leaving the Armed Forces to
continue to defend their country—against the enemy within—by entering the law
enforcement profession.
Narcotics traffic drives street crime. President Bush has, for the first time, used the resources
of our Armed Forces against the international drug trade. By our insistence, multilateral
control of precursor chemicals and money laundering is now an international priority. We
decry efforts by congressional Democrats to slash international anti-narcotics funding and
inhibit the most vital control efforts in Peru. We support efforts to work with South and
Central American leaders to eradicate crops used to produce illegal narcotics.
The Republican Party is committed to a drug-free America. During the last twelve years, we
have radically reversed the Democrats' attitude of tolerance toward narcotics, vastly increased
federal operations against drugs, cleaned up the military, and launched mandatory testing for
employees in various fields, including White House personnel. As a result, overall drug abuse
is falling. We urge that States and communities emphasize anti-drug education by police
officers and others in schools to educate young children to the dangers of the chug culture.
Dope is no longer trendy.
We oppose legalizing or decriminalizing drugs. That is a morally abhorrent idea, the last
vestige of an ill-conceived philosophy that counseled the legitimacy of permissiveness.
Today, a similarly dysfunctional morality explains away drug-dealing as an escape, and
drive-by shootings as an act of political violence. There is no excuse for the wanton
destruction of human life. We therefore support the stiffest penalties, including the death
penalty, for major chug traffickers.
Drug users must face punishment, including fines and imprisonment, for contributing to the
demand that makes the drug trade profitable. Among possible sanctions should be the loss of
government assistance and suspension of drivers' licenses. Residents of public housing
should be able to protect their families against drugs by screening out abusers and dealers.
We support grassroots action to drive dealers and crack-houses out of operation.
Safe streets also mean highways that are free of drunken drivers and drivers under the
influence of illegal drugs. Republicans support the toughest possible State laws to deal
with drunken drivers and users of illegal drugs, who deserve no sympathy from our courts or
State legislatures. We also oppose the illicit abuse of legal chugs.
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White-collar crime threatens homes and families in a different way. It steals secretly, forcing
up prices, rigging contracts, swindling consumers, and harming the overwhelming majority
of business people, who play fair and obey the law. We support imprisonment for those who
steal from the American people. We pledge an all out fight against it, especially within the
political machines that control many of our major cities. We will continue to bring to justice
corrupt politicians and those who collude with them to plunder savings and loans.

1992 Republican Party Platform. The American Presidency Project.
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/republican-party-platform-1992
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Excerpt from the 1996 Democrat Party Platform
Fighting crime. Today's Democratic Party believes the first responsibility of government is
law and order. Four years ago, crime in America seemed intractable. The violent crime rate
and the murder rate had climbed for seven straight years. Drugs seemed to flow freely across
our borders and into our neighborhoods. Convicted felons could walk into any gun shop and
buy a handgun. Military-style assault weapons were sold freely. Our people didn't feel safe in
their homes, walking their streets, or even sending their children to school. Under the thumb
of special interests like the gun lobby, Republicans talked tough about crime but did nothing
to fight it.
Bill Clinton promised to turn things around, and that is exactly what he did. After a long hard
fight, President Clinton beat back fierce Republican opposition, led by Senator Dole and
Speaker Gingrich, to answer the call of America's police officers and pass the toughest Crime
Bill in history. The Democratic Party under President Clinton is putting more police on the
streets and tougher penalties on the books; we are taking guns off the streets and working to
steer young people away from crime and gangs and drugs in the first place. And it is making
a difference. In city after city and town after town, crime rates are finally coming down.
Community policing. Nothing is more effective in the fight against crime than police officers
on the beat, engaged in community policing. The Crime Bill is putting 100,000 new police
officers on the street. We deplore cynical Republican attempts to undermine our promise to
America to put 100,000 new police officers on the street. We pledge to stand up for our
communities and stand with our police officers by opposing any attempt to repeal or weaken
this effort. But we know that community policing only works when the community works
with the police. We echo the President's challenge to Americans: If 50 citizens joined each of
America's 20,000 neighborhood watch groups, we would have a citizen force of one million
strong to give our police forces the backup they need.
Protecting our children, our neighborhoods, and our police from criminals with guns. Bob
Dole, Newt Gingrich, and George Bush were able to hold the Brady Bill hostage for the gun
lobby until Bill Clinton became President. With his leadership, we made the Brady Bill the
law of the land. And because we did, more than 60,000 felons, fugitives, and stalkers have
been stopped from buying guns. President Clinton led the fight to ban 19 deadly assault
weapons, designed for one purpose only -- to kill human beings. We oppose efforts to restrict
weapons used for legitimate sporting purposes, and we are proud that not one hunter or
sportsman was forced to change guns because of the assault weapons ban. But we know that
the military-style guns we banned have no place on America's streets, and we are proud of
the courageous Democrats who defied the gun lobby and sacrificed their seats in Congress to
make America safer.
Today's Democratic Party stands with America's police officers. We are proud to tell them
that as long as Bill Clinton and Al Gore are in the White House, any attempt to repeal the
Brady Bill or assault weapons ban will be met with a veto. We must do everything we can to
stand behind our police officers, and the first thing we should do is pass a ban on cop-killer
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bullets. Any bullet that can rip through a bulletproof vest should be against the law; that is the
least we can do to protect the brave police officers who risk their lives to protect us.
Tough punishment. We believe that people who break the law should be punished, and
people who commit violent crimes should be punished severely. President Clinton made
three-strikes-you're-out the law of the land, to ensure that the most dangerous criminals go to
jail for life, with no chance of parole. We established the death penalty for nearly 60 violent
crimes, including murder of a law enforcement officer, and we signed a law to limit appeals.
The Democratic Party is a party of inclusion, and we respect the conscience of all Americans
on this issue.
We provided almost $8 billion in new funding to help states build new prison cells so violent
offenders serve their full sentences. We call on the states to meet the President's challenge
and guarantee that serious violent criminals serve at least 85 percent of their sentence. The
American people deserve a criminal justice system in which criminals are caught, the guilty
are convicted, and the convicted serve their time.
Fighting youth violence and preventing youth crime. Nothing we do to fight crime is more
important than fighting the crime and violence that threatens our children. We have to protect
them from criminals who prey on them -- and we have to teach them good values and give
them something to say yes to, so they stay away from crime and trouble in the first place.
The Democratic Party understands what the police have been saying for years: The best way
to fight crime is to prevent it. That is why we fought for drug-education and gang-prevention
programs in our schools. We support well thought out, well organized, highly supervised
youth programs to provide young people with a safe and healthy alternative to hanging out on
the streets. We made it a federal crime for any person under the age of 18 to possess a
handgun except when supervised by an adult. Democrats fought to pass, and President
Clinton ordered states to impose, zero tolerance for guns in school, requiring schools to expel
for one year any student who brings a gun to school.
At the same time, when young people cross the line, they must be punished. When young
people commit serious violent crimes, they should be prosecuted like adults. We established
boot camps for young non-violent offenders. If Senator Dole and the Republicans are serious
about fighting juvenile crime, they should listen to America's police officers and support the
steps Democrats have taken, because they are making a difference, and then they should join
us as we work to do more.
We want parents to bring order to their children's lives and teach them right from wrong, and
we want to make it easier for them to take that responsibility. We support schools that adopt
school uniform policies, to promote discipline and respect. We support community-based
curfews to keep kids off the street after a certain time, so they're safe from harm and away
from trouble. We urge schools and communities to enforce truancy laws: Young people
belong in school, not on the street.
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We also know that we must do everything we can to help families protect their children,
especially from dangerous criminals who have made a dark habit of preying on young
people. Study after study shows that sex offenders are likely to repeat their crimes again and
again. Under President Clinton, we have taken strong steps to help keep children safe. We
required every state in the country to compile a registry of sex offenders. The President
signed Megan's Law to require that states tell a community whenever a dangerous sexual
predator enters its midst. We support the President's directive to the Attorney General, calling
on her to work with the states and Congress to develop a national sex offender registry. This
will ensure that police officers in every state can get the information they need from any state
to track sex offenders down and bring them to justice when they commit new crimes.
Battling illegal drugs. We must keep drugs off our streets and out of our schools. President
Clinton and the Democratic Party have waged an aggressive war on drugs. The Crime Bill
established the death penalty for drug kingpins. The President signed a directive requiring
drug testing of anyone arrested for a federal crime, and he challenged states to do the same
for state offenders. We established innovative drug courts which force drug users to get
treatment or go to jail. We stood firm against Republican efforts to gut the Safe and Drug
Free Schools effort that supports successful drug-education programs like D.A.R.E. The
Clinton Administration went to the Supreme Court to support the right of schools to test
athletes for drugs. The President launched Operation Safe Home to protect the law-abiding
residents of public housing from violent criminals and drug dealers who use their homes as a
base for illegal activities. We support the President's decision to tell those who commit
crimes and peddle drugs in public housing: You will get no second chance to threaten your
neighbors; it is one strike and you're out. We are making progress. Overall drug use in
America is dropping; the number of Americans who use cocaine has dropped 30 percent
since 1992. Unfortunately casual drug use by young people continues to climb. We must
redouble our efforts against drug abuse everywhere, especially among our children.
Earlier this year, the President appointed General Barry McCaffrey to lead the nation's war
on drugs. General McCaffrey is implementing an aggressive four part strategy to reach young
children and prevent drug use in the first place; to catch and punish drug users and dealers; to
provide treatment to those who need help; and to cut drugs off at the source before they cross
the border and pollute our neighborhoods. But every adult in America must take
responsibility to set a good example, and to teach children that drugs are wrong, they are
illegal, and they are deadly.
Ending domestic violence. When it strikes, nothing is a more dangerous threat to the safety of
our families than domestic violence, because it is a threat from within. Unfortunately,
violence against women is no stranger to America, but a dangerous intruder we must work
together to drive from our homes. We know that domestic violence is not a "family problem"
or a "women's problem." It is America's problem, and we must all fight it. The Violence
Against Women Act in the 1994 Crime Bill helps police officers, prosecutors, and judges to
understand domestic violence, recognize it when they see it, and know how to deal with it. In
February, the President launched a 24 hour, seven-day, toll-free hotline so women in trouble
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can find out how to get emergency help, find shelter, and report abuse to the authorities. The
number is 1 800 799-SAFE. Everyone who knows it should pass it on to anyone who might
need it. Every American must take the responsibility to stop this terrible scourge. As we fight
it, we must remember that the victims are not to blame. This is a crime to be punished, not a
secret to be concealed.
We must do everything we can to make sure that the victims of violent crime are treated with
the respect and the dignity they deserve. We support the President's call for a constitutional
amendment to protect the rights of victims. We believe that when a plea bargain is entered in
public, a criminal is sentenced, or a defendant is let out on bail, the victims ought to know
about it, and have a say. A constitutional amendment is the only way to protect those rights in
every courtroom in America.

1996 Democrat Party Platform. The American Presidency Project.
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Getting Tough on Crime
"Women in America know better than anyone about the randomness and ruthlessness of
crime. It is a shameful, national disgrace that nightfall has become synonymous with fear for
so many of America's women." Bob Dole, May 28, 1996 in Aurora, Colorado
During Bill Clinton's tenure, America has become a more fearful place, especially for the
elderly and for women and children. Violent crime has turned our homes into prisons, our
streets and schoolyards into battlegrounds. It devours half a trillion dollars every year.
Unfortunately, far worse could be coming in the near future. While we acknowledge the
extraordinary efforts of single parents, we recognize that a generation of fatherless boys
raises the prospect of soaring juvenile crime.
This is, in part the legacy of liberalism - in the old Democrat Congress, in the Clinton
Department of Justice, and in the courts, where judges appointed by Democrat presidents
continue their assault against the rights of law-abiding Americans. For too long government
policy has been controlled by criminals and their defense lawyers. Democrat Congresses
cared more about rights of criminals than safety for Americans. Bill Clinton arbitrarily closed
off Pennsylvania Avenue, the nation's Main Street, for his protection, while his policies left
the public unprotected against vicious criminals. As a symbol of our determination to restore
the rule of law - in the White House as well as in our streets - we will reopen Pennsylvania
Avenue.
After the elections of 1994, the new Republican majorities in the House and Senate fought
back with legislation that ends frivolous, costly, and unnecessarily lengthy death-row
appeals, requires criminals to pay restitution to their victims, speeds the removal of criminal
aliens, and steps up the fight against terrorism. Congressional Republicans put into law a
truth-in-sentencing prison grant program to provide incentives to states which enact laws
requiring violent felons to serve at least 85% of their sentences and replaced a myriad of
Democrat "Washington knows best" prevention programs with bloc grants to cities and
counties to use to fight crime as they see fit. They put an end to federal court early-release
orders for prison overcrowding and made it much harder for prisoners to file frivolous
lawsuits about prison conditions.
There's more to do, once Bill Clinton's veto threats no longer block the way. We will
establish no-frills prisons where prisoners are required to work productively and make the
threat of jail a real deterrent to crime. Prisons should not be places of rest and relaxation. We
will reform the Supreme Court's fanciful exclusionary rule, which has allowed a generation
of criminals to get off on technicalities.
Juvenile crime is one of the most difficult challenges facing our nation. The juvenile justice
system is broken. It fails to punish the minor crimes that lead to larger offenses, and lacks
early intervention to keep delinquency from turning into violent crime. Truancy laws are not
enforced, positive role models are lacking, and parental responsibility is overlooked. We will
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stress accountability at every step in the system and require adult trials for juveniles who
commit adult crimes.
In addition, not only is juvenile crime on the rise, but unsupervised juveniles (especially at
night) are most often the victims of abuse in our society. Recognizing that local jurisdictions
have a clear and concise understanding of their problems, we encourage them to develop and
enact innovative programs to address juvenile crime. We also encourage them to consider
juvenile nocturnal curfews as an effective law enforcement tool in helping reduce juvenile
crime and juvenile victimization.
Juvenile criminal proceedings should be open to victims and the public. Juvenile conviction
records should not be sealed but made available to law enforcement agencies, the courts, and
those who hire for sensitive work in schools and day-care centers.
Because liberal jurists keep expanding the rights of the accused, Republicans propose a
Constitutional amendment to protect victims' rights: audio and visual testimony of victims
kept on file for future hearings, full restitution, protection from intimidation or violence by
the offender, notification of court proceedings, a chance to be heard in plea bargains, the right
to remain in court during trials and hearings concerning the crimes committed against them, a
voice in the sentencing proceedings, notice of the release or escape of offenders. Bill Clinton
hypocritically endorsed our Victim's Rights Amendment while naming judges who opposed
capital punishment, turned felons loose, and even excused murder as a form of social protest.
Bob Dole, the next Republican president will end that nonsense and make our courts once
again an instrument of justice.
While the federal government's role is essential, most law enforcement must remain in the
hands of local communities, directed by State and local officials who are closely answerable
to the people whose lives are affected by crime. In that regard, we support community
policing; nothing inhibits local crime like an officer in the neighborhood. Bill Clinton
promised 100,000 more police officers on the beat but, according to his own Attorney
General, delivered no more than 17,000. He ignored local law enforcers by tying the program
in knots of red tape and high costs. Now he is diverting millions of its dollars, appropriated
by congressional Republicans to fight street crime, to state parks and environmental projects.
It's time to return those anti-crime resources to communities and let them decide what works
best to keep their homes, schools, and workplaces safe. This would result in far more new
police officers than Bill Clinton's program and give communities additional crime fighting
resources they need.
We will work with local authorities to prevent prison inmates from receiving disability or
other government entitlements while incarcerated. We support efforts to allow peace officers,
including qualified retirees, to assist their colleagues and protect their communities even
when they are out of their home jurisdictions to the extent this is consistent with applicable
state and local law. We will amend the Fair Labor Standards Act so that corrections officers
can volunteer to assist local law enforcement.
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Crimes against women and children demand an emphatic response. Under Bob Dole and
Dick Zimmer's leadership, Republicans in Congress pushed through Megan's Law - the
requirement that local communities be notified when sex offenders and kidnappers are
released - in response to the growing number of violent sexual assaults and murders like the
brutal murder of a little girl in New Jersey. We call for special penalties against thugs who
assault or batter pregnant women and harm them or their unborn children. We endorse Bob
Dole's call to bring federal penalties for child pornography in line with far tougher State
penalties: ten years for a first offense, fifteen for the second, and life for a third. We believe it
is time to revisit the Supreme Court's arbitrary decision of 1977 that protects even the most
vicious rapists from the death penalty. Bob Dole authored a tough federal statute which
provides for the admissibility of prior similar criminal acts of defendants in sexual assault
cases. This important law enforcement tool should serve as a model for the states. We
continue our strong support of capital punishment for those who commit heinous federal
crimes; including the kingpins of the narcotics trade.
We wish to express our support and sympathy for all victims of terrorism and their families.
Acts of terrorism against Americans and American interests must be stopped and those who
commit them must be brought to justice. We recommend a Presidentially appointed "blue
ribbon" commission to study more effective methods of prosecuting terrorists.
Only Republican resolve can prepare our nation to deal with the four deadly threats facing us
in the early years of the 21st Century: violent crime, drugs, terrorism, and international
organized crime. Those perils are interlocked - and all are escalating. This is no time for
excuses. It's time for a change.

1996 Republican Party Platform. The American Presidency Project
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Appendix B
Rhode Island and Illinois Provisions
RHODE ISLAND
CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE I. DECLARATION OF CERTAIN CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND
PRINCIPLES
§ 23. Rights of victims of crime
A victim of crime shall, as a matter of right, be treated by agents of the state with dignity,
respect and sensitivity during all phases of the criminal justice process. Such person shall be
entitled to receive, from the perpetrator of the crime, financial compensation for any injury
or loss caused by the perpetrator of the crime, and shall receive such other compensation as
the state may provide. Before sentencing, a victim shall have the right to address the court
regarding the impact which the perpetrator's conduct has had upon the victim.
MICHIGAN
CONSTITUTION
CHAPTER 1. CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE
ARTICLE I. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
§ 24. Rights of crime victims; enforcement; assessment against convicted defendants
(1) Crime victims, as defined by law, shall have the following rights, as provided by law:
The right to be treated with fairness and respect for their dignity and privacy throughout the
criminal justice process.
The right to timely disposition of the case following arrest of the accused.
The right to be reasonably protected from the accused throughout the criminal justice
process.
The right to notification of court proceedings.
The right to attend trial and all other court proceedings the accused has the right to attend.
The right to confer with the prosecution.
The right to make a statement to the court at sentencing.
The right to restitution.
The right to information about the conviction, sentence, imprisonment, and release of the
accused.
(2) The legislature may provide by law for the enforcement of the section.
(3) The legislature may provide for an assessment against convicted defendants to pay for
crime victims rights.

VictimLaw. Office of Justice Programs.
https://www.victimlaw.org/victimlaw/#:~:text=VictimLaw%20is%20a%20searchable%20dat
abase%20of%20victims%27%20rights,of%20related%20court%20decisions%20and%20atto
rney%20general%20opinions.
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New Jersey and Arizona Provisions
NEW JERSEY
CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE I. RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES
Section 22. Rights of crime victims
A victim of a crime shall be treated with fairness, compassion and respect by the criminal
justice system. A victim of a crime shall not be denied the right to be present at public
judicial proceedings except when, prior to completing testimony as a witness, the victim is
properly sequestered in accordance with law or the Rules Governing the Courts of the State
of New Jersey. A victim of a crime shall be entitled to those rights and remedies as may be
provided by the Legislature. For the purposes of this paragraph, "victim of a crime" means:
a) a person who has suffered physical or psychological injury or has incurred loss of or
damage to personal or real property as a result of a crime or an incident involving another
person operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and b) the
spouse, parent, legal guardian, grandparent, child or sibling of the decedent in the case of a
criminal homicide.
ARIZONA
CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE 2. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
§ 2.1. Victims' Bill of Rights
Section 2.1. (A) To preserve and protect victims' rights to justice and due process, a victim
of crime has a right:
1. To be treated with fairness, respect, and dignity, and to be free from intimidation,
harassment, or abuse, throughout the criminal justice process.
2. To be informed, upon request, when the accused or convicted person is released from
custody or has escaped.
3. To be present at and, upon request, to be informed of all criminal proceedings where the
defendant has the right to be present.
4. To be heard at any proceeding involving a post-arrest release decision, a negotiated plea,
and sentencing.
5. To refuse an interview, deposition, or other discovery request by the defendant, the
defendant's attorney, or other person acting on behalf of the defendant.
6. To confer with the prosecution, after the crime against the victim has been charged,
before trial or before any disposition of the case and to be informed of the disposition.
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7. To read pre-sentence reports relating to the crime against the victim when they are
available to the defendant.
8. To receive prompt restitution from the person or persons convicted of the criminal
conduct that caused the victim's loss or injury.
9. To be heard at any proceeding when any post-conviction release from confinement is
being considered.
10. To a speedy trial or disposition and prompt and final conclusion of the case after the
conviction and sentence.
11. To have all rules governing criminal procedure and the admissibility of evidence in all
criminal proceedings protect victims' rights and to have these rules be subject to
amendment or repeal by the Legislature to ensure the protection of these rights.
12. To be informed of victims' constitutional rights.
(B) A victim's exercise of any right granted by this section shall not be grounds for
dismissing any criminal proceeding or setting aside any conviction or sentence.
(C) "Victim" means a person against whom the criminal offense has been committed or, if
the person is killed or incapacitated, the person's spouse, parent, child or other lawful
representative, except if the person is in custody for an offense or is the accused.
(D) The Legislature, or the people by initiative or referendum, have the authority to enact
substantive and procedural laws to define, implement, preserve and protect the rights
guaranteed to victims by this section, including the authority to extend any of these rights to
juvenile proceedings.
(E) The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights for victims shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others granted by the Legislature or retained by victims.

VictimLaw. Office of Justice Programs.
https://www.victimlaw.org/victimlaw/#:~:text=VictimLaw%20is%20a%20searchable%20dat
abase%20of%20victims%27%20rights,of%20related%20court%20decisions%20and%20atto
rney%20general%20opinions.
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Appendix C
Keyword Crime Coding Methods
Keyword searches of all documents were conducted, and returns were reviewed to
determine whether the keywords were related to the subject of crime. References to the word
crime were excluded if they were made by any person other than the president, for example,
when made by a reporter or another individual, such as a foreign prime minister or president.
In addition, search returns which located the word crime were excluded when referencing
crime that occurred in another country and when lacking reference to a joint crime-fighting
effort between the U.S. and another country. References to transnational crime-fighting
efforts were coded as relevant to the study because of the potential to affect domestic
criminal victimization. For example, references to drug trafficking crime fighting efforts with
other countries were reasoned to be relevant as they may affect the domestic crime rate and,
thus, be of interest to those concerned of domestic criminal victimization. Search returns
which referenced domestic crimes, crime rates, fighting crime, a party’s policy response to
crime, concern over crime, crime as an important issue in society, causes of crime, etc. were
recorded as relevant to the study. Additionally, organized crime, gun crimes, hate crimes,
crimes related to terrorism after 9/11/2001, were coded as relevant. Search returns that were
coded as irrelevant were crimes that occurred within a country that did not involve the U.S.,
or where involvement of U.S. policy was not anticipated. Use of the word crime to reference
non-criminal actions were coded as non-relevant.
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Appendix D
PHREG Results
Model Fit Statistics
Criterion

Without
With
Covariates Covariates

-2 LOG L

214.338

176.866

AIC

214.338

190.866

SBC

214.338

200.904

Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0
Test

Chi-Square DF Pr > ChiSq

Likelihood Ratio

37.4716

7

<.0001

Score

36.1585

7

<.0001

Wald

31.1543

7

<.0001

Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter Standard
Hazard
Estimate
Error Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq Ratio

Parameter

DF

MechEase

1

0.62556

0.25423

6.0545

0.0139

1.869

Innovation

1

1.33735

0.42702

9.8084

0.0017

3.809

Igsystem

1

-0.05342

0.27736

0.0371

0.8473

0.948

CrimePk

1

1.13334

0.28237

16.1099

<.0001

3.106

Competition

1

0.32942

0.65525

0.2527

0.6151

1.390

RepControl

1

-0.34412

0.82317

0.1748

0.6759

0.709

PresRhet

1

-0.03715

0.12675

0.0859

0.7695

0.964

